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Compelled Expression and the
Public Forum Doctrine
Howard M. Wasserman"
This Article analyzes the theory underlying the Fist Amendment protection against
being compelled by government to utter, present, or fund unwanted expression. The author
creates a three-part model for determining when the fire speech ights of an objecting payer
have been trggered Under that model, FirstAmendment rights are implicated when there has
been an actual government compulsion requiring an individual to give money to, or for the
express benefit of, a specific private speaker for some use that, in itself, should be understood as
expressive. This model strikes a necessary balance between the important theoretical
underpinnings of the protection against being compelled financially to support private speech
and the First Amendment commitment to the dissemination of the maximum amount of
individual expression.
The model shows how to resolve FirstAmendment challenges to the use ofgovernment-
compelled funding of public forums-including streets and parks, public University student
activities fee programs, and the National Endowment for the Arts-when those forums are used
by objectionable speakers or for offensive speech. The key is that the payer is not compelled to
fund any objectionable speech or speaker The payer funds only the public forum, the physical
place and services associated with that place or the pool ofmoney in the subsidy program, none
of which is expressive. Under this model, all compelled-expression challenges to the
establishment and funding ofpublic forums must fail
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I. INTRODUCTION
Hard cases make bad law.' So do easy cases,' particularly when
no one realizes that they are easy.3 Board ofRegents of the University
of Wisconsin System v Southworth (Southworth] resides in that last
neighborhood.
Several students at the University of Wisconsin challenged the
University's mandatory student fee system, under which each student
was Tequired to pay a fee to the University, which money was placed in
a common pool, administered by the student government, and
distributed to registered student organizations for various political,
1. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 710 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("They say hard cases make bad law.").
2. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 106 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("The maxim that 'hard cases make bad law' may also apply to easy cases."); see also H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 (2d ed. 1994) (warning that in "plain case[s]" flexibility and
social goals may be sacrificed when rules are applied formalistically).
3. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 717 n.* (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("An easy case is especially likely to make bad law when it is unnecessarily
transformed into a hard case.").
4. 529 U.S. 217 (2000), rev'gSouthworth v. Grebe, 151 E3d 717 (7th Cir. 1998).
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ideological, and expressive activities.! The paying students argued that
the program violated their First Amendment rights by compelling them
to fund offensive or objectionable private speech. 6 South worth marked
an odd application of the compelled-expression doctrine, which
initially prohibited government from requiring individuals to utter or
present the government's own political message,7 and was extended to
prohibit government from compelling individuals to utter or present
the message of a private speaker or to pay money to private speakers
so they may present that message.! The United States Supreme Court
largely rejected the plaintiffs' free speech claims, holding that as long
as the university student activities fund was operated in a viewpoint-
neutral manner, as Wisconsin's program unquestionably was, the free
speech rights of the objecting students were sufficiently protected."
The conclusion was undoubtedly correct. But the Court failed to
recognize a key point. The university student activities fund was a
metaphysical public forum, akin to a street, park, or municipal
auditorium, established by government for use by private speakers.'
5. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 220-26; Grebe, 151 F.3d at 718-21.
6. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 220-27.
7. SeeWooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) ("[W]here the State's interest is
to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh
an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message."); W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,635-36 (1943) (striking down state-imposed
requirement of school flag salute and recitation of Pledge of Allegiance in public schools,
where ceremony touches on matters of opinion and political attitude); David B. Gaebler, First
Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression andAssociation, 23 B.C.
L. REV. 995, 997-1000 (1982); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Pledges, Parades, and Mandatory
Payments, 52 RUTGERs L. REv. 123, 131 (1999).
8. SeeHurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559
(1995) (holding that a state violates the First Amendment when it requires private citizens
who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message that the
organizers do not wish to convey).
9. SeeUnited States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001) ("We have not
upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the principal object
is speech itself."); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990) (holding that the state
bar, in which membership was required as a condition of practicing law in the state, could not
spend dues on certain ideological and political activities to which individual dues payers were
opposed); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (holding that the
Constitution prohibits a union from financing nongermane political expenditures with dues,
fees, or payments collected from objecting dues payers); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 136-38.
10. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233-34; infra notes 268-280 and accompanying text.
11. See Randall P'Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government
Speech, 86 IowA L. REv. 1377, 1424 (2001) (arguing that Southworth involved something
that "looked a lot like a public forum"); Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service
Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REv.
3, 46-47 (1983) (arguing that the collected pool of student fees is an expressive forum to
which students have access); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Link Between StudentActivity Fees
and Campaign Finance Regulations, 33 IND. L. REv. 435, 455-56 (2000) (arguing that the
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This follows for three reasons. First, the program, designed to provide
resources for private student expression, is an instrumentality of
communication, a program specifically used for the communication of
information and ideas, therefore subject to analysis as a public forum. 2
Second, this conclusion necessarily follows from the Court's earlier
decision in Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia
in which the Court held that a student activities fund-one materially
identical to the fund at issue in Southworth-was a "forum more in a
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same
principles are applicable."'3  Third, the conclusion follows from
recognizing that the University could have collected the same student
fees to build and maintain an on-campus park, stage, or auditorium,
unquestionably a public forum, for expressive use by student
organizations." Remarkably, however, the Southworth majority
ignored Rosenbergerand stated that the student activities fund is "not a
public forum in the traditional sense of the term."'5
The issue in the Southworth litigation should have been defined
as whether a payer may object to having her compelled funds used to
establish, fund, and maintain a public forum where that forum is used
by speakers to whom the payer objects or to present messages with
which she disagrees. The answer to that question is no.
This potential application of the compelled speech doctrine
provides a vehicle through which to undertake a broad examination of
the theory of compelled expression. 6 The recognition of an objecting
payer's right with respect to the student activities fund and other public
forums results in burdens on, and the closing of, places and programs
designed to broaden public discourse and to facilitate private
university student activities fees fund is a speech forum); infir notes 309-340 and
accompanying text.
12. See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forur--From Sidewalks to Cybempace,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1576 (1998); infra notes 326-328 and accompanying text.
13. 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995); Gey, supra note 12, at 1603 (arguing for taking the
notion of a metaphysical public forum seriously and applying the same reasoning for physical
property public forum disputes to public subsidy cases); see infra notes 310-322 and
accompanying text.
14. See Southworth v. Grebe, 157 E3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wood, D., J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("It is the same as if they simply built a large
auditorium and held it open for everyone."); infra notes 323-325 and accompanying text.
15. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 230; Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1424
(stating that the Court tried hard to avoid characterizing the student activities fund as a public
forum).
16. For purposes of simplicity, the general term "compelled expression" refers both
to situations in which an individual is forced to utter or present a particular message and in
which she is compelled to fund a private message or messenger.
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expression, resulting in an overall loss of speech in the marketplace."
It is imperative that we sharply, clearly, and narrowly define the
contours of the right against compelled expression and of what we
understand as instances of compelled funding of expression. Not
every compelled payment from an individual qualifies as compelled
expression. Instead we must establish obvious lines to determine when
an individual is, in fact, being compelled to utter, present, or support
private speech she does not wish to utter, present, or support.
The solution is to devise a test for when the right against
compelled financial support for expression has been triggered that
incorporates certain necessary limiting principles. This model asks
whether the compelled payer is (1)required or compelled by the
relevant governmental body (through law, regulation, or fiat), (2)to
give money to, or for the express benefit of, a private recipient, (3) for
that recipient's expressive activities. The objecting payer's right will be
triggered only if the funds are mandated by government and go
directly from the payer to, or for the specific and express benefit of, a
particular private speaker for immediate uses that are expressive."
17. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1427 (arguing that recognizing the
objecting payer's claim "requires a remedial means that is unworkable because any system
requiring optional fees or a way for students to opt out from paying for specified activities
would be disruptive and expensive and thus ineffective"); Abner S. Greene, Government of
the Good, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1, 13 (2000) ("[W]hile it is possible to issue pro rata refunds of
the dues of nonunion members, it would be impossible (i.e., prohibitively costly) to do the
same for taxpayer refunds."); see also THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 645 (1970) ("One important way in which the government can affirmatively
promote a system of freedom of expression is by making available to individuals and groups
the facilities for engaging in expression"); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities
Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1366 (2001) ("The permissible range of government action
is different when it promotes speech, rather than restricts it."); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 456
("[W]here the government creates and structures a public forum, its speech-conscious action
may serve rather than thwart free speech clause values.").
18. The First Amendment protection from compelled funding of expression rests on
the premise, which we accept, that money, when spent for expressive purposes, is expressive
and implicates free speech concerns and that compelling an individual to fund speech is the
same as compelling that individual to speak. See Jacobs, supra note 11, at 451-52; see also
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) ("Just as the First Amendment
may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the
government from... compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they
object." (internal citation omitted)); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977)
("[C]ontributing to an organization for the purpose of spreading a political message ...
'implicate[s] fundamental First Amendment interests."' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 23 (1976))). But see United Foods, 533 U.S. at 425 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[The
program] does not compel speech itself, it compels the payment of money. Money and
speech are not identical").
19. See discussion infra Part Ill.
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This model establishes the reasoning that the Court should have
used to reject the objecting students' challenge to the public university
student activities fund in Southworth, as well as future challenges to
mandatory fees and assessments used to fund all public forums,
physical and metaphysical, within and without the university setting.
No payer in any political community has a right to object to the use of
her funds to establish and maintain a physical or metaphysical public
forum, regardless of the speech occurring in and through that forum.
The reason is that no speech is, in fact, funded with those compelled
payments; only the forum, the physical place or the pool of money, is
funded. A forum, in and of itself, is not expressive." Whatever private
speech ultimately occurs in and through that forum is irrelevant to the
payer's claim. Moreover, the immediate recipient of the funds in
public forum cases is the governmental body that establishes and
maintains the forum, not the private speaker who uses it; payers have
no right to object to any governmental expenditures of compelled
funds, whether that expenditure is expressive or nonexpressive.
Part I of this Article reviews the doctrine and theory underlying
the First Amendment freedom from compelled expression. We
examine four categories of compelled-expression cases, as well as the
theoretical issues underlying the protection. We also examine the need
for limiting principles on the scope of what is understood as compelled
financial support for private speech. Part II establishes our controlling
model for determining whether a compelled payer's free speech right
has been triggered. Part III discusses the Southworth litigation,
considering the problems with, and effects of, the Supreme Court's
analysis. Part IV explains how the Court should have addressed and
resolved Southworth, based on the recognition that the student
activities fund is a public forum and that the First Amendment right to
object is not triggered when one is compelled to fund such a public
forum. We then apply the three-part model to show why objecting
payers' rights are not triggered by the compulsion to fund either the
student activities fund in Southworth or any other public forum-
because funding a public forum entails funding not private expression,
but a nonexpressive government program, to which a payer may not
object on First Amendment grounds.
20. SeeGreene, supra note 17, at 14 ("It is the open forum that is funded .... ); infra
notes 353-366 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 115-152 and accompanying text.
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II. COMPELLED EXPRESSION: AN OVERVIEW
A. Categories of Compelled Expression
The jurisprudence and commentary on compelled expression
recognize several categories or factual situations potentially
implicating the right against compelled expression. All rest on similar
underlying premises and justifications, although the applicable rules
may differ. We consider four categories:
1. compelled utterance or presentation of a message;
2. compelled subsidization of private expression;
3. compelled subsidization of private expression pursuant to a
government program; and
4. compelled subsidization of government's expressive and
nonexpressive activities.
2
1. Compelled Utterance or Presentation of Message
The first and most obvious example of compelled expression is
actual compulsion to speak-a governmental requirement that an
individual utter or present some statement or message to the public,
usually a message approved and supported by the government.2 This
category originated in West Virginia Board of Educaton v Bamette,
where the Court addressed the constitutionality of a World War II law
requiring public school students to salute the flag and recite the Pledge
of Allegiance as part of the school's educational program.4 The
22. We do not discuss two other compulsion situations raising First Amendment
concerns, which are less applicable to the public forum context. One is forced expressive
association. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (holding that the
Boy Scouts could not be required under state public accommodations law to admit
homosexual scoutmaster); see also Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. McFadden, HUAC,
The Hollywood Ten, and the Fist Amendment Right of Non-Association, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1669, 1689 (2001) (exploring the First Amendment connections between Dale and the
blacklisting of the Hollywood Ten in the early 1950s); David E. Bernstein, The Right of
Expressive Association and Private Universities' Racial Preferences and Speech Codes, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 629-38 (2001) (analyzing free speech under university
diversity rules). A second is compelled access to privately owned speech forums, such as
media outlets. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (holding
that the requirement that cable systems carry broadcast networks is consistent with the First
Amendment); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that
the choice of material to go into a newspaper constitutes editorial discretion not subject to
governmental regulation consistent with the First Amendment).
23. See Robert D. Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced Expression, 34 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 101, 102 (1999) ("[G]ovemment had directed human beings to express, by
mouth and/or by a communicative physical act, a defined political or religious viewpoint.").
24. 319 U.S. 624, 626-27 & n.2 (1943); see also Jacobs, supra note 7, at 123 ("It all
started with the pledge of allegiance.").
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plaintiffs were parents of students who were Jehovah's Witnesses, who
believed that the American flag was an image that their religious
beliefs forbade them to salute or otherwise worship." Three years
earlier, the Court had upheld a similar flag-salute requirement.26
The Bamette Court began by noting that the sole conflict was
between state authority and the right of the individual to self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal
attitude; there was no interference with the rights of others, who
remained free to recite the pledge themselves.27 Second, while
government could instill patriotism and loyalty to country through
education and instruction in the history and structure of government,
the issue was whether it could compel the declaration of that loyalty.
Third, the flag had meaning as a symbol of adherence to government
and the salute and pledge required the individual to communicate by
word and deed the acceptance of the political ideas the flag bespeaks.29
Moreover, the Pledge "requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude
of mind."3
The Court then considered and rejected the idea that the
Constitution permitted government compulsion of expression as a
means of achieving the government's interest in national unity.1
Government under the Constitution was by consent of the governed,
but the Bill of Rights denied government the power to coerce that
consent, as opposed to achieving it through education and persuasion.2
25. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629-30.
26. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591-600 (1940); Gaebler,
supra note 7, at 997 & n. 11; see also Jacobs, supra note 7, at 131 n.50 (suggesting that the
Court's change three years later was due to the fact that World War II was almost over and the
need for statutes compelling national unity was less urgent than it had been). For analysis of
the flag salute cases, see generally 1 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FLAG: THE FLAG SALUTE
CASES (Michael Kent Curtis ed., 1993).
27. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630; Michael Kent Curtis, Introduction to 1 THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE FLAG: THE FLAG SALUTE CASES, supra note 26, at xxxii; Stephen W
Gard, The Flag Salute Cases and the Fist Amendmen4 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 419, 423 (1982),
repintedin 1 THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FLAG: THE FLAG SALUTE CASES, supra note 26, at
293,293.
28. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631; Curtis, supra note 27, at xxxii ("The issue was not
about ends but about means."); Gard, supra note 27, at 293 & n.30 (arguing that the Court
stated the question in the case as whether government could "enforce patriotism by the means
of compelling an affirmation of belief").
29. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633; see also Curtis, supra note 27, at xxxii-xxxiii;
Gaebler, supra note 7, at 998.
30. See Bamette, 319 U.S. at 633.
31. See Curtis, supra note 27, at xxxiii ("At bottom, the Barnette Court rejected the
ideas about compelled national unity that were the heart of Gobitis.").
32. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
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As for the notion that the failure to compel patriotism and national
unity, by permitting intellectual and spiritual contrariness, would lead
to the disintegration of society, the Court rejected that as resting on "an
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds."33
The Court closed with a well-known rhetorical flourish:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.34
Barnette laid the ground for free speech protection from government
demands that one "express ... acceptance of or agreement with any
particular belief."35
The next opportunity for the Court to address direct government
compulsion of a message came thirty years later in Wooley v
Maynard36 Two more Jehovah's Witnesses, husband and wife citizens
of New Hampshire, objected to displaying the state motto "Live Free
or Die" on their license plates; they covered the motto with tape and
were arrested three separate times on the misdemeanor charge of
obscuring a portion of the license plate from view.
The Court began with the proposition, drawn from Bamette, that
the "right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment
against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right
to refrain from speaking at all," both complementary components of
the broader concept of "individual freedom of mind."38 The Court
recognized that requiring a person to utter the Pledge created a more
serious infringement on personal liberties than the passive act of
displaying the state motto on the license plate, but found this to be a
difference only in degree." Instead, Barnette and Wooley both
involved state measures that forced an individual to serve as "an
33. See id.
34. Id at 642.
35. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 998.
36. 430 U.S. 705 (1977); see Gard, supra note 27, at 306 (stating that Barnette went
unused for years until rediscovered as a major freedom of expression precedent); see also
Gaebler, supra note 7, at 998 (suggesting that, prior to Wooley, direct application of a free
speech rationale was unnecessary because similar cases either were resolved on grounds of
free exercise of religion or on the ground that refusal to salute the flag was an affirmative
symbolic expressive act, presented through silence).
37. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707-08; Gaebler, supra note 7, at 999.
38. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714; see also Cantor, supra note 11, at 11; Gaebler, supra
note 7, at 999.
39. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Gaebler, supranote 7, at 999.
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instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable." ' Fundamental free speech interests were
implicated by a state attempt to require an unwilling individual to use
her private property as a "mobile billboard" for the government's
ideological message on threat of criminal penalty."'
The Court considered and rejected the state's asserted interest in
requiring display of the motto as a way to promote appreciation of
history, individualism, and state pride; no matter how legitimate the
interest in communicating government ideology, it did not and could
not outweigh the individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier of that message." New Hampshire's interest in
promoting appreciation of its history was no different, and no more
sufficient, than West Virginia's interest in promoting patriotism and
national unity; Wooley and Barnette thus were "not merely analogous,
but doctrinal twins.""'
The most recent example of compelled direct presentation of a
message was Hurley v In'sh-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group, Inc."4 The Massachusetts public accommodations law had been
applied to require the private organizers of South Boston's St. Patrick's
Day Parade to allow the Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston
(GLIB) to march in the parade under its own banner."5 The Court
found that a parade is a form of expression, composed of its banners
and songs and marked by its overall symbolism."6 Moreover, the
parade need not have a single, narrow, succinctly articulable message
40. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Gaebler, supra note 7, at 999-1000; Gard, supra
note 27, at 306.
41. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; see also Gard, supra note 27, at 318-19 ("It is
simply contrary to the democratic premise of the first amendment to allow the government to
compel the unconsenting to use their person or privately owned property as a 'mobile
billboard' for the State's ideological message." (internal quotation omitted)).
42. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716-17; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 132.
43. Gard, supra note 27, at 318.
44. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). Hurley could be analyzed as a compelled-access case, in
which the state law at issue required a private forum owner to provide access to another
private speaker. See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 135-36 (discussing Hurley as compelled access
case); Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First
Amendment Theory: Redistubutive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV.
1083, 1126 (1999) (same). Because the Hurley Court focused on the parade organizers as
particularized speakers presenting a chosen message, it properly may be viewed in this
category of compelled-expression cases.
45. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 560-63; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 135-36.
46. SeeHurley, 515 U.S. at 568-69 ("[W]e use the word 'parade' to indicate marchers
who are making some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along
the way.").
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in order to avail itself of First Amendment protection. It followed that
the parade organizer was a distinct private speaker, with the right to
assemble its own message by combining nonoriginal, multifarious
voices. The selection of those contingents to form the overall parade
message was entitled to protection." Every participating unit affected
the content of that message, meaning the forced inclusion of a
particular unit inevitably and impermissibly altered the expressive
content of the parade and of the parade organizer's message."
Hwley is distinct from Barnette and Wooley in that the
compelled message to be presented (GLIB's banner and the group's
message of being Irish, gay, and proud)"0 is not that of government, but
of another private speaker. But this does not change the analysis,
because in both situations government compels a private speaker to
present some message not its own." The Hurley Court recognized
Barnette as establishing a general prohibition on government
compulsion of affirmance of beliefs, values, opinions, and facts with
which an individual disagrees;52 this applied regardless of the source
(governmental or private) of the beliefs, values, opinions, and facts
compelled. The parade organizer's claim to the benefit of this general
principle was "as sound as the South Boston parade is expressive." 3
The parade organizers had decided to exclude a message they did
not like from their parade message, and that was sufficient to invoke
their rights as private speakers to shape expression, by speaking on one
subject and remaining silent on another." The right to autonomy over
the content of the message would be compromised by any
47. Seeid at 569-70.
48. See id. ("Rather like a composer, the [parade organizer] selects the expressive
units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score may not produce a
particularized message, each contingent's expression in the [organizer's] eyes comports with
what merits celebration on that day.").
49. See id. at 570 (stating that the selection of contingents to make a parade is
entitled to protection); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 136.
50. The Hurley Court noted:
GLIB was formed for the very purpose of marching in [the parade] ... in order to
celebrate its members' identity as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendents of
the Irish immigrants, to show that there are such individuals in the community, and
to support the men and women who sought to march in the New York parade.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570.
51. Moreover, we may assume that the government agrees with or supports the
compelled private message, or at least that the government wants the message to be presented
to the public, through the public accommodations law that protects gays and lesbians.
52. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573-74.
53. See id. at 574.
54. See id.
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government-imposed requirement that a speaker disseminate a view
contrary to its own."
2. Compelled Subsidization of Private Expression
While Barnette, Wooley, and Hurleyreflect the early paradigm of
compelled speech-a speaker forced to utter a government-prescribed
or government-favored message-modem examples of compelled
expression tend to be less obvious, less dramatic, and more complex. 6
The second category involves government-compelled funding or
financial support of political and ideological expression by private
speakers and organizations.
Abood v Detroit Board of Education marked the first time a
Court majority" held that the First Amendment rights of objecting
nonunion employees were violated by a labor union's use of
mandatory member dues payments for political and ideological
speech, where nonunion employees were required to pay dues to the
union pursuant to an agency-shop agreement established in accordance
with state law.8 The required payment of such dues was designed
(1) to promote labor peace by establishing a single authorized
bargaining unit empowered to enter into a single agreement with
management and (2) to distribute the costs of union activities among
all those workers who benefit, avoiding a free-rider problem. 9
The Court recognized that compelling employees to support the
union financially impacted employees' First Amendment interests."
But in the context of collective bargaining, contract administration,
grievance adjustments, and other core union activities, such compelled
payments were permissible, justified by those state interests. 6' As long
55. See id. at 576; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 136.
56. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 102.
57. See Cantor, supra note I1, at 8-10 (discussing earlier cases of this type that drew
only a plurality or that were decided on statutory rather than constitutional grounds); see also
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750 (1961) (plurality opinion) (construing
statute to prohibit use of objectors' dues to finance political campaigns and to promote
political doctrines); Ry. Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (same).
58. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211-12 (1977); Gaebler, supra note
7, at 1000; Jacobs, supranote 7, at 136-37; see also Cantor, supra note 11, at 12 (stating that
Abood made a "quantum leap by connecting forced fees payments to a service institution
with impermissible, compelled ideological association").
59. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 224; see also Cantor, supra note 11, at 12; Gaebler, supra
note 7, at 1000.
60. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
61. See id. at 225 ("[l]mportant government interests ... presumptively support the
impingement upon associational freedom created by the agency shop here at issue."); see also
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as the union used the fees to promote those causes for which it was
formed and for which it brought members together, an individual payer
could not withdraw financial support merely because she disagreed
with the group's contract strategy.62 This was true even if all the
union's activities could be regarded, in some sense, as political.63
However, the Court drew a "constitutional line."' Employees
could not be required to contribute funds to those ideological and
political causes that the individual payer may oppose.65 The union
could spend money to support political candidates or political causes
or to engage in activities that, in the Court's view, were not "germane"
to the union's duties as a collective bargaining representative.6 But the
union could use only funds collected from those employees who were
not required to pay and who did not object to advancing these ideas. 7
The Court suggested that the remedy would be restitution to the
objecting employee of a fraction of her union dues, equal to the
fraction of total union expenditures that were made for the
impermissible objectionable political purposes.
In Keller v State Bar of Califomi4 the Court extended Aboodto
an integrated state bar, to which all attorneys must belong and pay dues
as a condition of practicing law in the state.69 The Court held that the
bar could fund from the mandatory dues of its members only those
activities "germane" to the bar's goals of regulating the legal
profession and improving the quality of legal services, but not
expression of an ideological nature that falls outside the scope of those
activities." The Court attempted to define the latter category, setting
the standard as "whether the challenged expenditures are necessarily or
reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession
or improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of
the State."7' The Court declined to illustrate these categories, although
it outlined the extreme ends: government could not expend
compulsory dues to endorse or advance a gun control or nuclear
Cantor, supra note 11, at 12-13 (stating that the Court found the impairment of ideological
interests justified insofar as the fees were used for contract-related expenses).
62. SeeAbood, 431 U.S. at 223.
63. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 13.
64. See id.
65. SeeAbood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 235-36; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 136-37.
68. SeeAbood, 431 U.S. at 238.
69. 496 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990).
70. Seeid at 13-14.
71. Id. at 14 (internal quotations omitted).
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weapons freeze initiative, but it could use those dues for activities
connected with disciplining members of the bar or proposing ethical
codes for the profession."
In Lehnent v Ferns Faculty Ass'n, the Court returned to public
employee, agency-shop agreements, establishing a three-part test for
determining which side of the Abood/Keller line a union expenditure
fell.73 Chargeable activities (those that may be funded with the dues of
all payers) must: "(1) be 'germane' to collective-bargaining activity;
(2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor peace
and avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly add to the
burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency
or union shop."7 Among "germane" activities were threatening and
preparing for a strike (even a strike that would have been illegal) and
paying for the chargeable activities of state and national affiliates of
the local union that ultimately may inure to the benefit of the local by
virtue of membership." Nonchargeable activities (those that could be
financed only with the dues of agreeing, noncompelled payers)
included lobbying and other political activities outside the limited
context of contract ratification or implementation, as well as
establishing a program designed to secure funds for public education
in the state.76
Arguments have been made for extending Abooc-type
protections to a superficially similar situation: corporate expressive
expenditures using invested moneys of shareholders who object to the
corporation's message. These arguments justify restrictions on
corporate speech pursuant to a compelling government interest in
protecting the free speech interests and values of dissenting
shareholders." The idea is that restrictions on corporate political and
72. See id at 15-16; see also id. at 5 (describing the bar's nonexpressive, germane
activities, which included "examining applicants for admission, formulating rules of
professional conduct, disciplining members for misconduct, preventing unlawful practice of
the law, and engaging in study and recommendation of changes in procedural law and
improvement of the administration of justice" (internal quotations omitted)); id at 5-6 & n.2
(listing some of the challenged activities, including lobbying against legislation criminalizing
the display of drug paraphernalia or creating exclusions from the gift tax and lobbying for
state legislation prohibiting possession of armor-piercing handgun ammunition and for
creating an unlimited right of action to sue anybody causing air pollution).
73. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
74. Id at 519.
75. Id at 524, 531-32.
76. See id at 522, 527; id. at 559 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
77. See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General
Motors. Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 235,
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ideological expenditures are justified by the "need to protect individual
stockholders against being forced to choose between contributing to
political or social expressions with which they disagree or foregoing
opportunities for profitable investment."78 The lesson of Abood and
Keller is that "financial supporters of an association do not give up
their own First Amendment rights of freedom of association and
speech simply because they supply money to the group" and this
lesson protects corporate investors and shareholders.79 Commentators
have defended requirements that corporations use segregated funds,
under which the corporation engages in political and ideological
expression only with funds collected separately from explicitly
consenting shareholders, as an alternative to an Abood-type pro rata
refund."
The compelled-shareholder argument has never attained a
majority of the Court; in Bellottl* the majority expressly rejected the
position.' The refusal to extend the protections of Abood and Keller
to corporations and corporate shareholders is proper. Most
importantly, the state does not compel shareholders to invest at all or to
invest in any particular company; this contrasts with unions, in which
state laws permitting agency-shop agreements may require individuals
at least to pay money to the union (even if they do not join as full
members) as a condition of holding a job, engaging in an occupation,
271 (1998) (describing the arguments); see alsoAustin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 673 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that requiring a corporation to fund
political speech only from a segregated fund of moneys collected from consenting
shareholders was justified by the state's interest in protecting shareholders from funding
objectionable political speech); id. at 675 (arguing that the state "surely has a compelling
interest in preventing a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do not wish to
contribute" to political expression); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 812
(1978) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state could take steps to protect individual
shareholders and to ensure that they are not compelled to support and financially further
ideas, beliefs, and positions with which they disagree, at least where the speech did not
materially affect the business or property interests of the corporation).
78. Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockolders'Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 268 (1981); see id. at 270 (arguing that the First Amendment
interests of objecting investors are similar to those of objecting union-dues payers and offer
comparable support to restrictions on speech by the private entity); Adam Winkler, Beyond
Bellotti, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 133, 200 (1998) ("To -the extent the corporation uses a
shareholder's money to support political causes he disagrees with, the shareholder may end
up feeling abused and powerless.").
79. See Winkler, supra note 78, at 210.
80. See Brudney, supra note 78, at 272. ButseeRedish & Wasserman, supra note 77,
at 279 (arguing that the speech of a corporation's segregated fund is not that of the
corporation, but of some subset of its shareholders).
81. See Bellottd, 435 U.S. at 794-95 & n.34.
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and earning a living.82 Absent that government compulsion, there can
be no First Amendment violation arising from payments to private
organizations, even if those payments are used for expressive
83purposes. Where corporate investors are concerned, no state law
compels them to invest their money in a particular company; the
choice is voluntary, or at least free of government compulsion.84
Perhaps one could compare an individual worker's decision to
enter a particular occupation in a particular location (such as practicing
law in California) to the decision to invest in a company, both of which
are equally voluntary.85 But that is the wrong analogy, focused on the
wrong step. The decision to enter the legal profession is properly
analogous to the equally voluntary individual decision to invest money
in some manner or form in the first instance, without regard to where.
The compelled-speech inquiry must focus on the presence or
absence of government compulsion in the choice to pay money to the
relevant private organization (union, bar association, or corporation)-
in other words, the choice to pay money to the speaker. State law
commanded the objecting attorneys in Keller to join the state bar. 6
But the law does not compel anyone to invest in, or give money to, any
particular corporation; investment in the company must be understood
as voluntary. If state law compelled individual investment in (or
subsidization of), for example, Microsoft and its expression, the
analysis arguably would change.
82. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("One need not become a
member of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce or the Sierra Club in order to earn a
living."); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795 n.34 (arguing that no shareholder has been compelled to do
anything, that the decision to invest in a corporation is made of the shareholder's own
volition); see also Redish & Wasserman, supra note 77, at 275 ("The difference between
labor unions and corporations, then, amounts to the difference between state-compelled
membership as a prerequisite to earning a living and voluntary investment.").
83. SeeUnited States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,413 (2001) ("[A] threshold
inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed obligation which makes group
membership less than voluntary .... ); Cantor, supra note 11, at 19 ("A first amendment
violation would not seem to arise without government prescription of a message or forced
identification with, or affirmation of, a message by the payor.").
84. This disposes of the argument that, for example, a member of a pension fund has
no knowledge of or real control over where her money will be invested. See Winkler, supra
note 78, at 210. Accepting that as true, the decision as to where the money goes still is not
made by the government and does not raise free speech concerns. To the extent a pensioner's
investment in a particular company is compelled, it is compelled by the private operators of
the pension fund, not by the government.
85. See Winkler, supra note 78, at 210 ("In none of these scenarios does the state
force anyone to join. It is up to the individual to make the free choice whether to go to work
at a union shop, practice law as a profession,.... or invest in a corporation.").
86. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1990).
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The Bellotti majority correctly noted that the more relevant and
appropriate analogy is between a voluntary corporate shareholder and
an employee who joins the union but later comes to disagree with its
position on some issue."s Both scenarios entail voluntary membership
and subsequent disagreement with some aspect of the organization's
message. Objecting payer cases involve an objector who has been
made a less-than-voluntary member of the speaking organization.8
3. Compelled Subsidization of Expression Pursuant to Government
Programs
A third category of compelled expression, closely related to the
second, involves compelled payments for what might be called
semiprivate speech pursuant to a government program. In these cases,
a government program establishes a private speaking entity to which
individuals in a particular industry must pay money, which money is
used by the entity, wholly or in part, for expressive purposes.
In Glickman v Wileman Bros. & Elliot4 federal law limited
competition in the tree-fruit industries in favor of collective industry
action, including providing the industry with an antitrust exemption. 9
The law gave the Secretary of Agriculture the power to issue marketing
orders-a species of economic regulation-covering a range of
industry activities, implemented by a committee comprised of industry
members." All industry participants paid mandatory assessments to
cover expenses, administration, research, and other collective
activities.' Among the activities covered (and paid for with the
collected assessments) was generic product advertising, designed to
serve common industry interests in promoting the sale of tree fruits.
The message of the advertisements was that California tree fruits
generally (without regard to producer) were "wholesome, delicious,
and attractive to discerning shoppers."92
The Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the generic
advertising program brought by several objecting industry members,
emphasizing the unique statutory context at issue, in which a broader
collective enterprise constrained individual freedom of action and in
87. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795 n.34.
88. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 513 (1991) (noting that
plaintiffs were members of the faculty, required to pay fees to the union); Keller, 496 U.S. at 6
(noting that plaintiffs were members of the bar, as required by state law).
89. 521 U.S. 457, 461 (1997).
90. Seeid at 461-62.
91. See id. at 462.
92. See id.
179
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which the funding of generic advertising was part of that broader
enterprise." The Court removed the case from the compelled-
expression mold, because the marketing program did not compel
producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views.94
Abood "did not announce a broad First Amendment right not to be
compelled to provide financial support for any organization that
conducts expressive activities," but only a right of "not being
compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities
conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.' 95 In any event, the Court
found that the test as stated in Kellerhad been met, in part because the
assessments were not used to fund ideological activities. 6 Moreover,
the advertising at issue did not form any particular message, "other
than encouraging consumers to purchase California tree fruit. '" 7 To the
extent that was a specific message, the Court assumed that the
complaining producers would agree with this general idea.98
Taken seriously, Wileman Bros. eliminates the AboodKeller
category of compelled-expression protection. Defined broadly, a
union and its dues payers agree with the basic organizational goal of
protecting the economic and other interests of the workers, just as a
corporation and all its corporate shareholders hold in common the
basic goal of maximizing profits and the value of individual shares.
Disagreement exists, if at all, only as to the wisest expressive or
nonexpressive strategies for achieving that goal.9 Under Wileman
Bros., the individual payer's First Amendment rights do not extend to a
desire to pursue that agreed-upon common goal via a different
expressive strategy. '° Because any speech funded by any organization
presumably will serve (or at least be intended to serve) the ultimate
shared purpose, one could assume that any organizational speech in
fact reflects the shared goal, be it enhancing worker rights or
maximizing corporate profits.'0 ' Under this reasoning, a compelled
dues payer should have no right to opt out of funding any expressive
93. See id at 469, 475.
94. Seeid. at 469 & n.14; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 137-38.
95. Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 471; Jacobs, supranote 7, at 137.
96. See Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 473; see also Jacobs, supra note 7, at 151
(suggesting that Wileman Bros. eliminated free speech review of governmental action where
nonpolitical speech is involved).
97. Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 472.
98. See id. at 471 ("[N]one of the generic advertising conveys any message with
which respondents disagree.").
99. See Redish & Wasserman, supra note 77, at 278.
100. See WilemanBros., 521 U.S. at472, 474-75.
101. See Redish & Wasserman, supm note 77, at 278.
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activities, as long as those activities serve, or are intended to serve, that
common organizational goal.' 2
In addition, the Court seemed to adopt an all-or-nothing
approach, analyzing all expenditures together and considering the
predominant purpose of the regulatory program as a whole in
determining that First Amendment scrutiny should not apply to any
uses of compelled payments.' The Court did not separate expressive
and nonexpressive expenditures and apply First Amendment scrutiny
and germaneness analysis to the former, as it had in previous cases. In
Keller, for example, the state bar's primary purpose was
nonexpressive, as were the majority of its activities.' "  Had the
Wileman Bros. approach been applied in Keller, there would have
been no need to examine separately the other, expressive expenditures;
the predominance of nonideological activities would have been enough
to defeat the objectors' claims.
However, in United States v United Foods, Inc., the Court struck
down a similar federal mandatory assessment program, this time in the
mushroom industry, where most of the funds collected by the
statutorily established Mushroom Council were spent on generic
advertising promoting collective sales for the entire industry.'0 The
Court took a broader view of compelled expression, finding that First
Amendment interests attached because the producers were required by
the government program to subsidize speech with which they
disagreed. The fact that the disagreement with the generic message
was minor-the objecting producer wanted to convey the message that
its mushrooms were better than others--did not alter the fact of that
disagreement. 6 Nor did the Court again confine Aboodand Kellerto
political or ideological speech, backing away from the suggestion that
compelled funding of speech on any other subject matter is not subject
to First Amendment scrutiny.'0 7
The Court distinguished Wileman Bros., where the compelled
assessments for generic advertising had been part of a larger statutory
scheme that established a cooperative market and deprived tree-fruit
102. This also disposes of the pension fund argument, because the contributing fund
member will agree with the general profit-making purpose of the fund manager's decisions.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
103. See Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 469, 474-75.
104. SeeKeller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990).
105. 533 U.S. 405,408-09 (2001).
106. See id. at 411.
107. See id. at 413 ("[S]peech need not be characterized as political before it receives
First Amendment protection.").
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producers of the ability to compete, not only through speech, but
through production and sales.' °8 By contrast, the mushroom program
did not regulate how mushrooms could be produced, sold, or marketed,
did not provide an antitrust exemption, and did not create a
cooperative, noncompetitive marketplace.' °9 The only collective action
required of mushroom growers was that they pay money to the
Mushroom Council to generate the very speech to which some of the
growers objected."'
The Court also found that generic advertising was not germane to
any primarily nonexpressive organization independent of speech, as in
Abood Keller, or Wileman Bros., because there was no overarching
nonexpressive program beyond advertising. It was not enough that the
speech paid for with compelled funds be germane to itself."' Justice
Stevens, who authored the majority opinion in Wileman Bros., joined
the majority in United Foods, and, in a short concurring opinion,
emphasized the absence of that broader regulatory scheme and the
presence of only a naked compulsion to support speech, which is no
different than a naked restriction on speech."2
4. Compelled Subsidization of Government's Expressive and
Nonexpressive Activities
The fourth category of compelled funding involves mandatory
payments to the government. Governments at all levels collect the
greatest amount of mandatory and compelled payments from
individuals, through receipt of taxes, assessments, fees, fines, and
other contributions to the public fisc.' We can break compelled
payments to government into two subcategories, as government uses
collected payments for both nonexpressive and expressive purposes.'"
4
a. Nonexpressive Government Activities
It is agreed that no taxpayer may object to the use of her
payments for nonexpressive policy activities-war efforts, promotion
108. Seeid at414-15.
109. Seeidat412-13.
110. Seeidat415.
111. See id
112. See id. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
113. Cantor, supra note 11, at 3 (stating that the taxpayer is the most obvious example
of a person having money extracted from her to promote various objects).
114. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REv. 87, 111 (2002)
(arguing that government expresses an opinion and point of view through the passage of
legislation).
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of reproductive choices, provision of welfare or health insurance
benefits to the poor, provision of subsidies to corporations-even if
those policies offend her moral, political, or ideological sensibilities."5
The First Amendment protects freedom of thought and conscience as a
concomitant of the freedom to speak (and not to speak)."' The
protection of conscience does not extend to objections to supporting
nonexpressive governmental actions that, presumably, represent the
will of the majority that placed the acting officials in office."7 Rather,
some incursion on conscience from nonexpressive government
activities is "an inevitable concomitant of living in an organized
society.""' 8 The First Amendment does not and cannot elevate "pure
peace of mind" to the highest constitutional status in an organized
society; the result would be administrative gridlock, as government
attempts the impossible task of funding public programs and policies
only with taxes or payments collected from those members of the
polity who support a particular program or policy."9 The result would
be a prohibitive restriction on representative government's ability to act
at all.
Instead, one must accept that she will lose some electoral and
legislative battles, and that the result of losing in a democratic process
will be having to live under, and pay taxes and other fees for, some
115. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 3 (arguing that pacifists' taxes fund war efforts and
antiabortion activists' taxes further birth control and abortion); see also Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) ("The government, as a general
rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on
protesting parties."); Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289, 297
(2001) ("A person gets no special immunity from the tax code just because he objects to the
federal government and wants to communicate this view by not paying.").
116. SeeWooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind."'); Alexander Meiklejohn, The Kirst Amendment Is an
Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 257 (arguing that a citizen "may not be told what he shall
or shall not believe"); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1403
(2002) ("The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from
the government because speech is the beginning of thought.").
117. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 21 ("It is a truism that a minority of citizens... may
be bound by collective judgments which are ideologically repugnant.").
118. Cantor, supra note 11, at 25; see also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 ("It is
inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its
constitutional powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere
convictions of some of its citizens.").
119. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 26 (arguing that, because the range of conscientious
objections to public policy is limitless, pure peace of mind cannot be elevated in an organized
society without serious administrative entanglements); Greene, supra note 17, at 17 ("[T]he
justification for any particular use of tax dollars should not have to overcome these stricter
hurdles of legitimacy, but rather merely those of policy.").
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unwanted laws and policies.2 ° Government is indeed by the consent of
the governed, and that consent must be voluntarily given.'2' But having
consented to the formation of government and to being part of a
majoritarian community, a citizen cannot, via her First Amendment
right of conscience, control the way government spends money from
its treasury in furtherance of the majority's policy goals. So long as
any laws do not infringe some constitutional right, the individual must
comply with (and pay for) them, at least until the next electoral
measurement of a majority in some political constituency that might
bring about a change in public policy.'22 The First Amendment
demands only that the objector maintain her right to dissent from
objectionable policies by speaking against the policies and the elected
officials who pass and enforce them. 3
b. Expressive Government Activities
Government necessarily possesses broad discretion to select and
put forward its own message as a way of presenting, explaining, and
defending its policies to the People.'24  Such participation by
government in public debate not only is legitimate, but absolutely
necessary in a democratic political system.'
120. SeeGreene, supra note 17, at 18.
121. SeeW Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943); c/THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed... ).
122. Cf Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office.: Separation
of Powers or Separation ofPersonnel, 79 CORNELL L. RE. 1045, 1093 (1994) (describing
"complex and highly sophisticated" multitiered method for sampling the will of the people, in
which different constituencies of the people make majority determinations at set intervals).
123. See Greene, supra note 17, at 17-18 (emphasizing that dissent must be left open
and that the government's conception of the good should be only one of many advanced); see
also STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 10 (1999)
(arguing that dissenters, those who challenge existing customs and authorities, are central to
the First Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the MissingAmendments:
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124, 152-53 (1992) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment shifted the center of gravity of free speech, towards protection of speech
opposed to, and critical of, popularly accepted governmental policies and prevailing social
norms).
124. SeeLegal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (emphasizing the
latitude that exists where the government's own message is being delivered); Southworth, 529
U.S. at 229 ("[lIt seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for
speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies."); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("When the government disburses public
funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and
appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee.").
125. See EMERSON, supra note 17, at 698 ("Participation by the government in the
system of freedom of expression is an essential feature of any democratic society."); MARK G.
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In order to represent the People, democratic government-and
the elected and appointed public officials through whom democratic
government speaks-must be able to speak to the People, to inform,
explain, justify, educate, defend, and persuade as to the wisdom and
goodness of its policy initiatives and decisions.'26 Government speech
enhances public debate by providing an additional voice and viewpoint
in the marketplace, one that enables the People to evaluate government
policy and to decide whether to support or oppose that policy, one that
YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA 41 (1983) ("It is absurd, then, in the modem contexts, to adopt the position that
government speech.., is an illegitimate enterprise in a liberal democratic state."); Randall P.
Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum. Forbes and Finley and Government Speech
Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REv. 953, 980 (1998) ("For democracy to function,
government and government officials must be able to explain themselves and gather support
for collective government action, whether in the form of legislation, adjudication, policy
formulation, or the conduct of war."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1380
("Government speech, then, must be understood as essential in a republican democracy, and
as a necessary inference from the constitutional structure of American government."); Cantor,
supra note 11, at 30 (arguing that there are "innumerable ways in which government
legitimately speaks"); David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.YU. L. REV. 675, 703 (1992) ("Government
must voice its views in order for the system of self-government to operate...."); Gard, supra
note 27, at 315 ("[I]t must be recognized that the government does have a legitimate interest
in participating in public debate."); Gey, supra note 12, at 1602 ("[C]reating public policy,
informing the public about the policy's content, and defending the policy against political
opponents is the central purpose of a democratic government."); Greene, supra note 17, at 17-
18 ("[T]he government may advance particular conceptions of the good and encourage
people to follow such conceptions... ); Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government
Subsidies and Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REv. 543, 560 (1996) ("A democratic society
must permit the government on occasion to communicate with the populace, both with its
own voice and through the voices of others.").
126. See EMERSON, supra note 17, at 698 (arguing that government's ability to speak
enables it to "inform, explain, and persuade-measures especially crucial in a society that
attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force" and "provides the facts, ideas, and
expertise not available from other sources"); YUDOF, supra note 125, at 41 (arguing that
eliminating government speech would deprive government of a primary means of protecting
and enhancing democratic values, of enforcing its public policies, and of improving its
leadership capacity); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1380 ("Government must explain,
persuade, coerce, deplore, congratulate, implore, teach, inspire, and defend with words.");
Cantor, supra note 11, at 30 ("Government has legitimate functions in informing, educating,
persuading, and leading the public."); id. at 31 ("[I]t is a legitimate government function to
'lead' and thus to promote certain ideological perspectives."); Cole, supra note 125, at 703
("[G]overnment needs to be able to carry out and rally support for its programs by explaining
their benefits."); Greene, supra note 17, at 8 ("[G]overnment communication can assist the
execution of law through explaining and supporting the laws that are enacted."); Redish &
Kessler, supra note 125, at 565 ("From the perspective of democratic theory, it is essential
that these government employees inform the populace of the government's policies and
initiatives."); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 334, 364 (1991) ("If private speakers attempt to manipulate people by
omitting information or counter-arguments, the government can supply what is missing.").
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the People take into account in making political decisions such as
whether to vote for the same public officials in the next election.'
Indeed, the Court has stated that it would be "ironic if those charged
with making governmental decisions were not free to speak for
themselves in the process.""' Ultimately, the ability of democratic
government to speak for itself is central to its survival.'29
Government's unrestricted power to speak in its own voice with
taxpayer funds rests on the same majoritarian principles as its power to
act in nonexpressive ways with those funds. Speech "by the
government" really refers to the speech of whatever majority political
constituency won control at the last election.'30 A government official
presumptively espouses the views of that constituency of the People
that she represents, or at least the majority of that constituency that
placed her in office.'"' Any government expression necessarily is in
furtherance of that majoritarian political representation, just as any
nonexpressive policy actions are in furtherance of that majoritarian
representation. Individual citizens, having lost the legislative or
electoral battle, must accept the burden of paying taxes and fees
127. See YUDOF, supra note 125, at 43 (arguing that speech from institutions such as
government "provide[s] information and other prerequisites for the exercise of the citizen's
judgment about political issues and candidates" and may increase the citizen's ability to make
informed choices); Cole, supra note 125, at 703 ("[T]he people need to know their
representative's views to decide whether to support them .... ); Abner S. Greene,
Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667, 1684 (2001) ("We trust
the people to distinguish good arguments from bad ones all the time .... Why can't we trust
the very same population to weed out bad governmental arguments from good ones?");
Redish & Kessler, supra note 125, at 565 (arguing that government speech makes citizens
better able to hold government actors accountable by providing more information with which
to judge the performance of political leaders).
128. SeeKeller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
129. See YUDOF, supra note 125, at 41 (arguing that restrictions on speech would strip
government of a primary means of "securing its ability to survive"); Bezanson, supra note
125, at 980 ("Without the capacity to act as a speaker, government could not do many of the
things it does and must do."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1380 (arguing that none of
government's tasks could be successfully pursued without speech by government); Cole,
supra note 125, at 702 ("[G]overnment functions in large measure through communication
and persuasion .... ); Greene, supra note 17, at 8 ("It is hard to imagine government
functioning without communicating.").
130. Gey, supra note 12, at 1602.
131. See YUDOF, supra note 125, at 152 ("[I]n a representative democracy public
officials must by definition represent the preferences of the majority in some sense, or at least
be responsive to citizen preferences in a procedural setting that is recognized as fair and
legitimate."); Cole, supra note 125, at 703 ("We elect representatives because we believe they
'speak for us'; it would be perverse to disempower them from speaking once they become
government actors."); see also Keller, 496 U.S. at 12 ("Government officials are expected as a
part of the democratic process to represent and to espouse the views of a majority of their
constituents.").
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towards majority-favored government speech in support of those
majority-favored policy choices. 32 Again, the individual retains her
vital First Amendment right to engage in counterspeech and to seek
out competing, contrary voices and messages.3 ' Most importantly,
government ultimately is accountable to the electorate and the political
process if its speech or policies prove unpopular.'
There are two primary objections to government speech. One
focuses on its power to skew or dominate the marketplace of ideas and
the public debate, as a singular, uniquely powerful voice blessed with
greater resources and a greater ability to be heard by, and to influence,
the People.' Government speech, it is argued, distorts the thinking
processes of listeners by capturing the audience, muffling other voices,
and forcing listeners to submit to the government's message.'36
Government power to teach, inform, and persuade necessarily equals
the converse power to indoctrinate, distort judgments, and perpetuate
the current political regime.
132. See Greene, supra note 17, at 18 (arguing that one of the burdens on the
individual of losing the majoritarian battle is to listen to and help fund speech that she
opposes, such as speech by the government).
133. See id. at 17-18; see also id. at 16 ("As a tax/dues/fees payer, a person remains
free to speak all she wants or not at all."); id. at 50 (discussing importance of listener,
confronted with government speech, being able to seek and find other views).
134. SeeBd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235
(2000) ("When the government speaks... it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and
the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later
could espouse some different or contrary position.").
135. See Cole, supra note 125, at 704 (discussing the potential that the government
might dominate or skew public dialogue); Greene, supra note 17, at 49 (suggesting that
government speech becomes problematic when it monopolizes the area of debate or closes
dissent); Greene, supra note 127, at 1682-83 (agreeing that government speech is a problem if
it monopolizes the speech market or coerces citizen choices); Robert D. Kamenshine, The
First Amendment Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. RE. 1104, 1104
(1979) ("The government has the potential to use its unmatched arsenal of media resources
and legislative prerogatives to obtain political ends, to nullify the effectiveness of criticism,
and, thus, to undermine the principle of self-government."); id. at 1108 ("[T]he government
would obviously still bring all of its prestige and economies of scale to bear on the political
debate.").
136. SeeYUDOF, supra note 125, at 168-69; see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11,
at 1511 (arguing that government speech should not "have the purpose or effect of
dominating expression on a particular subject or expression of a particular point of view,
displacing competing speech or private speech choices by the exercise of monopoly power
over a forum, or transforming private speech into an expression of government preference");
Kamenshine, supra note 135, at 1105 ("If a government can manipulate that marketplace, it
can ultimately subvert the processes by which the people hold it accountable.").
137. SeeYUDOF, supranote 125, at 42; Cantor, supranote 11, at 30-31; see also Gey,
supra note 12, at 1602 (stating that limitations on the manner in which government may speak
ensure that the majority does not abuse its power of speech in order to manipulate the results
of the next election).
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The second objection concerns governmental "ventriloquism," in
which government presents its message not with its own voice, but
through private speakers using government funds.'38 The problem with
ventriloquism is that the recipients of the speech, namely the People,
are less likely to recognize the governmental source of the message or
to understand the connection between a particular message and the
policy issues, making them less able to hold government properly
accountable for both.'39 Voters can recognize some level of self-interest
in the government's speech and discount the message by considering
the source.4 Evaluating and discounting the message becomes more
difficult, if not impossible, when government deputizes private persons
to foster its views and positions and does not clearly present the
message itself, as its own.'"' So, too, does the ability to hold
government accountable for its speech.' 2
The point of Bamette and Wooley is that, regardless of
government's unquestioned interest in speaking and spreading its
message, it may not conscript unwilling private citizens to assist in the
dissemination of that message or convert individuals into a billboard or
mouthpiece for that message. '  Beyond that, challenges to
government speech do not proceed from concerns for the rights of
objecting taxpayers not to have their tax dollars or other compelled
assessments spent for government speech.
138. See Greene, supra note 17, at 49 (defining governmental ventriloquism as
situations in which speech is not clearly defined as that of the government).
139. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1510 ("[G]overnment should be able to
act as a speaker only when it does so purposefully, with an identified message, which is
reasonably understood by those receiving it to be the government's message.").
140. See Greene, supra note 17, at 49 ("[C]lear identification of speech as the
government's enhances accountability .... ); Redish & Kessler, supra note 125, at 565
("[T]he populace can evaluate the message with an eye toward the messenger.").
141. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1510 (arguing that requiring government
to speak through an openly identified message permits the speech to be judged in terms of
the audience's receipt of the message and its understanding that the speech is the
government's own); Greene, supra note 17, at 50 (arguing that when the source of the speech
is masked, such value assessment "will be muted, not as sharp, the tasks not as clearly
defined"); Redish & Kessler, supra note 125, at 570 ("[Wlhen government fosters
dissemination of its positions by means of funding private party expression, the danger arises
that the public will fail to 'discount' the views expressed."); see also Gey, supra note 12, at
1609 ("[G]overnment retains the authority to speak on public issues-it simply must do so
with internal governmental resources, using public agencies and employees acting in their
official capacity.").
142. See Greene, supra note 17, at 50 (describing the "risk that the public will not see
clearly enough the connection between law and resulting speech to hold the government
properly accountable").
143. SeeGard, supranote 27, at 318-19.
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The result of "Aboocbwrit-large,"'" an Abooa-type, objecting
taxpayer's right grounded in the First Amendment, would be an
unworkable administrative scheme and, ultimately, the loss of all
government speech. Government only can express itself or
disseminate its message by expending taxes and other collected
revenues; constraints on the ability to collect and spend money
constrains government's sole means of communicating.'45 It would be
prohibitively costly to demand that government speak only with fees
collected from its supporting majority or that it establish a scheme of
opt-outs or pro rata refunds for taxpayers.' 6 The objection in Keller
and Abood--that a single recipient used dues to advance its own
causes-is absent in the taxpayer situation, where general taxpayer
funds are used for a wide array of government speech purposes.' 7
One limited contrary view recognizing an objecting taxpayer's
protection from funding government speech suggests a line between
government speech intended to inform about policies on one hand and
government speech intended to persuade, endorse, or advocate the
merits of those policies on the other; only the latter would trigger the
objector's right.' 8 Thus, a government agency could inform the People
about the details of a government policy or program, but could not tout
its merits or seek to garner popular support for it. "9
This argument ignores the fact that there always is an implicit
endorsement in any government speech about public policy. If the
relevant officials do not support and endorse the policy, they will not
adopt that policy in the first instance. The fact that a particular
proposal, program, or policy is passed and presented to the People
necessarily means that the government (i.e., a majority of the relevant
public officials representing a majority of the electorate in the most
144. Greene, supra note 17, at 12-13.
145. See Gard, supra note 27, at 320.
146. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1427 (arguing that Abood requires a
remedial means that is unworkable, because any system requiring optional fees or a way for
payers to opt out from paying for speech activities would be disruptive, expensive, and
ineffective); Cantor, supra note 11, at 26 (arguing that serious administrative entanglements
would inevitably result from a general objecting taxpayer's right); Greene, supra note 17, at
13 ("[W]hile it is possible to issue pro rata refunds of the dues of nonunion members, it
would be impossible (i.e., prohibitively costly) to do the same for taxpayer refunds."). The
administrative burden becomes even greater when we consider the possibility of shifting
supporting majorities on different issues-a taxpayer may support (and be willing to pay for)
the government's message on one subject matter, but oppose (and demand a refund of her
money for) the government's message on another.
147. SeeGreene, supranote 17, at 15.
148. SeeKamenshine, supranote 135, at 1128-29.
149. Seeid.at1129.
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recent electoral counting of some constituency of the People) thinks
the program is a good idea deserving public support.' That will be
clear to anyone receiving even a purely informational message. It is
impossible to draw a line between information and persuasion.
Moreover, such a line is ill advised. Because ultimate approval of
the policy rests with the electorate (through its power to change the
policy by changing the government), no government speech should
merely inform; it should inform and persuade the individual to form
some opinion or view on the government's actions."' Indeed, the
governmental source of the message assists in the opinion-forming
process by permitting the voter to consider that governmental source in
evaluating the message, perhaps leading the individual to oppose a
particular policy or program simply because of that governmental
source.,
52
B. Theoretical Bases of Compelled Expression
1. Individual Liberty
The protection against compelled expression is grounded
primarily in concerns for individual liberty underlying freedom of
speech. Under the individual liberty model, free speech is protected
because of its vital function in contributing to the speaker's individual
self-fulfillment and self-realization and to her development as a human
being.' 53  Speech develops human faculties of thought and belief,
150. See Koppelman, supra note 114, at 111 ("Through legislation, the government
can, and often does, express a point of view.")
151. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1380 (arguing that in a representative
democracy, "governments' speech must consist not just of information but also of
explanation, persuasion, and justification to a polity tethered to the policies and preferences
acted upon by its representatives"); Cole, supra note 125, at 703 ("[G]overnment needs to be
able to carry out and rally support for its programs by explaining their benefits.").
152. See Greene, supr note 17, at 50 (arguing that knowing the government source of
speech enables the listener more readily to assess its value); Redish & Kessler, supra note
125, at 565 (arguing that the People can evaluate the message with an eye toward the
messenger and can discount a governmental message accordingly).
153. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 69 (1989)
("Speech is protected because, without disrespecting the autonomy of other persons, it
promotes both the speaker's self-fulfillment and the speaker's ability to participate in
change."); EMERSON, supra note 17, at 6 ("[F]reedom of expression is essential as a means of
assuring individual self-fulfillment."); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 20-21 (1984) (arguing that speech facilitates the individual's ability to
control her own destiny and to develop human faculties); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH
IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 9 (1992) ("[F]reedom to speak without restraint provides the speaker
with an inner satisfaction and realization of self-identity essential to individual fulfillment.").
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central to the development of free and individual personhood.'54 The
prohibition on government-compelled expression or support of private
expression protects these interests in personhood and individual liberty
by prohibiting government interference with individual thought,
conscience, or belief through a requirement that one adopt, present, or
support any message or idea that she does not wish to adopt, present,
or support.'55 This is the heart of Barnette and the Constitution's
command that government may not declare orthodoxy in matters of
opinion and may not compel citizens to adopt that orthodoxy as their
own.
156
Government-compelled expression infringes upon individual
personhood in several ways. First, such compulsion interferes with an
individual's ability to define the persona she presents to the world,
depriving her of the opportunity to control, define, and shape her
public identity by choosing what to say or what not to say.' 7 The
essence of the injury is the deprivation of the individual's freedom to
154. See BAKER, supra note 153, at 59 ("[R]espect for individual integrity and
autonomy requires the recognition that a person has the right to use speech to develop herself
or to influence or interact with others in a manner that corresponds to her values.");
EMERSON, supra note 17, at 6 ("[S]uppression of belief, opinion, or other expression is an
affront to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature."); REDISH, supra note 153,
at 21 ("[T]he very exercise on one's freedom to speak, write, create, appreciate, or learn
represents a use, and therefore a development, of an individual's uniquely human faculties.");
SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 9 (arguing that the right of free speech is "a right defiantly,
robustly, and irreverently to speak one's mind just because it is one' mind').
155. See EMERSON, supra note 17, at 30 ("Forcing public expression of a belief is an
affront to personal integrity."); Cantor, supra note 11, at 15-16, 21 (arguing that Barnette and
its progeny can be explained as protection against forced ideological conformity and against
the affront to conscience from having to utter or publicly affirm a distasteful message or
support a distasteful cause); Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1004 (arguing that compelled
expression "does infringe upon what may be called the individual's interest in selfhood");
Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1114 (arguing that the harms wrought by compelled
expression disrupt the individual's ability to persuade and interfere with the autonomy of her
mental processes); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 576 (1995) ("[Wlhen dissemination of a view contrary to one's own is forced upon
a speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker's right to
autonomy over the message is compromised."); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
234-35 (1977) ("For at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual
should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped
by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.").
156. W Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.").
157. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1004-05.
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decide how she will present herself to the world, by depriving her of
the ability to control the messages she presents.'58
Second, compelled expression interferes with freedom of
conscience, an introspective focus on an individual's self-perception. '59
The injury arises from the individual's feelings of shame and disgrace
resulting from the compulsion to support speech not of her choosing
and her inability to defy the state on some matter of principle and to
stand up for her personal beliefs.'6° Professor Redish argues that the
injury to self-perception carries with it the further harm of "cognitive
dissonance, a psychological process whereby an individual who has
been forced to express a view contrary to her own eventually
rationalizes her actions by subconsciously adopting the positions she
has been forced to express."'61  The compulsion indoctrinates the
compelled speaker as to the chosen message.'62 Liberty interests are
infringed where the speech uttered, presented, or funded is not the
freely chosen expression of the speaker or funder.'63
Third, being compelled to speak or to support another's speech
alters the content and impact of the primary message that the
compelled speaker wishes to present. An objecting funder may speak
on her own, present her own message, and, perhaps, disclaim and
correct any misattribution from the compelled message.' 4 But that
does not alleviate the harm to individual liberty interests. First, the
responding speech itself is, in some sense, coerced, uttered not
158. Id at 1005; see Jacobs, supra note 11, at 453 (arguing that compelled speech
violates individual autonomy by publicly associating the speaker with the unwanted
message); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 156 (discussing the danger that the public will perceive a
compelled speaker as affirming some message); Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1114
(arguing that being compelled to speak publicly humiliates the speaker, thereby demoralizing
him and undermining his resolve to maintain his own positions).
159. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1005; see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
714 (1977) ("The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind."'); Barnette, 319 U.S. at
642 (holding that compelled flag salute "invades the sphere of intellect and spirit").
160. See Gaebler, supa note 7, at 1005-06.
161. See Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1114; see also id. at 1115-16 (describing
the use of compelled speech in totalitarian regimes as a tool to establish and maintain public
compliance, in part by coercing individuals to adopt propaganda messages as their own).
162. See Jacobs, supra note 11, at 453 ("[F]orced speech indoctrinates the speaker
163. See BAKER, supra note 153, at 69 (arguing that speech must be the freely chosen
expression of the speaker).
164. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1009 (arguing that government-compelled
expression does not restrict the expression of any specific views by individuals); Jacobs,
supra note 7, at 155 (arguing that the paraders in Hurley could have disclaimed or answered
the objectionable message with their own).
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necessarily as an exercise of the individual's free choice, but as a result
of the perceived need to counter the government-compelled message.'65
Second, the mixed message dilutes the impact of the speaker's own
chosen message, confusing the audience as to whether the speaker
favors her own message or the message she has been forced to present
or fund.
166
2. Marketplace of Ideas
It is somewhat less clear whether the compelled-expression
doctrine can be explained with reference to a second rationale for the
protection of free speech, the maintenance and enhancement of a
marketplace for the free exchange of ideas. Dissenting in Abrams v
United States, Justice Holmes first suggested that the Constitution
codifies the notion that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."'67 The
metaphor of the "marketplace of ideas" has been roundly criticized in
scholarly literature.' 68 However, one component of the marketplace of
165. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 28 (discussing argument that a compelled payer is
impelled to speak in order to counter the collective voice supported by her fumds); Jacobs,
supra note 7, at 156 ("The real danger in Hurley was that the compelled speech requirement
would provoke exactly the disclaimer or reply which would dispel the misattribution.").
166. See Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1115 ("[S]urely there would exist a
serious risk that the impact of the speaker's utterance of her own views would be diluted as a
result of the publicly degrading experience of having to mouth a position which the speaker
finds abhorrent."); see also id at 1114 (positing hypotheticals in which (1) Martin Luther
King was required, prior to his speech at a civil rights rally, to present a governmentally
authored defense of the morality of segregation, and (2) antiwar leaders were required to
articulate the government's position in support of the war at the start of every rally).
167. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); seeBAKER, supranote 153, at
6 ("According to this classic theory, truth is to be discovered through its competition with
falsehood."); EMERSON, supra note 17, at 6-7 ("An individual who seeks knowledge and truth
must hear all sides of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it
to opposition, and make full use of different minds."); SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 6 ("The
'marketplace of ideas' is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech tradition.");
Clay Calvert, Where the Right Went Wrong in Southworth: Underestimating the Power of
the Marketolace, 53 ME. L. REv. 53, 60-61 (2001) (describing origins of theory); William P.
Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a Frst Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L.
REv. 1, 1 (1995) (suggesting that the marketplace metaphor has been "virtually canonized");
Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1083 ("[I]t has not been uncommon for scholars or
jurists to analogize the right of free expression to a marketplace in which contrasting ideas
compete for acceptance among a consuming public.").
168. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 153, at 14-15 (rejecting assumptions underlying the
marketplace idea, particularly the rationale that people in the marketplace act rationally in the
receipt of speech); REDISH, supra note 153, at 46 (arguing that the marketplace rationale
creates the danger that someone will decide that she has attained knowledge of truth and is
justified in shutting off all contrary expression); SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 6-7 (detailing
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ideas underlies all speech-protective approaches to the First
Amendment: the maximum quantum of speech must be disseminated
by the greatest number of speakers to the greatest number of listeners,
with those participating in the process deciding which ideas,
information, and opinions to accept and which to reject. 69
The marketplace-of-ideas concept cuts in two directions with
regard to compelled expression. On one hand, compelling individuals
to speak or to support financially other private speakers facilitates a
greater amount of speech, likely from a greater number of speakers.
Ensuring more speech from more sources arguably ensures the
dissemination of a greater amount of speech and a broader, more
diverse, and more dynamic marketplace of ideas.'70 Compelled
payments to support private speakers similarly enhance the amount of
problems with marketplace metaphor, including advantages to wealthy speakers, the
continued presence of "shoddy ideas," and the infiltration of emotional distortions, such as
appeals to hate, into the realm of ideas); Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of
Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 951, 953-57 (1997) (criticizing the four implicit assumptions
of the marketplace ideal); Calvert, supra note 167, at 61-62 (noting that the economic-based
marketplace metaphor has been criticized and attacked, particularly on the grounds that truth
does not trump falsehood and that the marketplace is skewed in favor of speakers with greater
resources); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace ofIdeas. A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1, 5 (1984) (describing the real-world conditions that interfere with the effective operation of
the marketplace of ideas); Charles H. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go. Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 468 (1990) (arguing that the marketplace of
ideas permits racism and racist ideas to thrive); Marshall, supra note 167, at 2-3 (describing
the argument that objective or transcendent truth is unknowable).
169. See REDISH, supra note 153, at 48 (arguing that "there is probably no expression
of opinion or information that would not potentially affect" some individual life-affecting
decisions and that the "marketplace-of-ideas concept as a protector of all such expression
makes perfect sense"); see also id. at 102 (emphasizing the problem with regulations that
impair the free flow of information and reduce the sum total of information or opinion
disseminated); SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 5-6 (arguing that the inclusion of more
justifications for the "transcendent importance of free expression" will lead an open society
to "embrace principles protecting a richer range of expression"); Lillian R. BeVier,
Rehabilitating the Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories, 1992 SuR CT. REv. 79,
10 1-02 (1992) (discussing the Enhancement Model of the First Amendment, which assumes
that "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public, and that individuals have a constitutionally protected
interest in effective self-expression" (internal quotation omitted)); id. at 103 (arguing that the
Enhancement Model demands rules that "will maximize the opportunities for expression");
Marshall, supra note 167, at 4 ("The value that is to be realized is not in the possible
attainment of truth, but rather, in the existential value of the search itself.").
170. SeeCalvert, supranote 167, at 56-57 (arguing that government efforts to advance
the quantity and range of available speech will be viewed favorably); Jacobs, supr note 11, at
446 (discussing "collective majority's power to compel its members to support the common
purpose of adjusting the relative weights of the voices in the marketplace of ideas to promote
more full dialogue and debate."); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 175-76 (arguing that promoting
diverse expression might be a sufficient justification for compelled financing of private
speech).
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speech available to listeners in the marketplace, furthering free speech
interests of those listeners."'
For example, the ability to use all the money collected from dues
payers without restriction, and without obligation to refund some
portion, might enable the state bar in Keller to speak more often and
about more subjects and issues without having to shoulder any
administrative burdens in collecting and using moneys. Similarly, an
additional voice espousing an additional idea would have been
presented and heard as part of the aggregate message of the St.
Patrick's Day Parade had GLIB been permitted to march. In this
regard, the marketplace-of-ideas theory, while not necessarily requiring
government to compel support for private speech, would not prohibit
government from compelling support for private speakers if the
compelled expression furthers the more-diverse-speech goals.172
On the other hand, by restricting government's power to compel
expression, the First Amendment prevents government from
manipulating, skewing, and distorting the marketplace.73  The
marketplace remains, in a sense, free and unencumbered by
government control of the manner in which speakers and messages are
heard. Compelled support for private expression distorts the strength
and popularity of the substantive positions advocated by those private
entities favored with government-mandated funds.'4 Money facilitates
speech, and a greater amount of money facilitates a greater amount of
speech, while a lesser amount of money likely reduces the amount of
171. See Calvert, supra note 167, at 67 ("Viewed in the context of the audience's right
to receive a diversity of messages, the marketplace intervention measure of mandatory fee
assessments at public universities to support the speech of a myriad of student groups makes
perfect sense.").
172. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1009 ("[W]hile compelled expression may infringe
upon individual interests it should not be condemned as an interference with the 'free
marketplace of ideas."'); see also Jacobs, supra note 7, at 157 (arguing that the extent to
which government compulsion enhances the expression that enters the marketplace should
play a role in evaluating the constitutionality of compelled expression).
173. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 29 ("Potentially then, the free marketplace of ideas
could be skewed in directions favored by the government."); Kamenshine, supra note 135, at
1106 (arguing that government support of speakers and ideas threatens the free marketplace
of ideas necessary to self-government); id. at 1108-09 (arguing that governmental payment of
funds to private speakers distorts the marketplace of ideas).
174. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1009 (acknowledging that government can create a
false sense of support for a certain view by forcing expression of it); Jacobs, supra note 11, at
467 ("A danger of such speech-conscious government action is that it will distort public
perceptions of the support that certain ideas have and thereby distort individual truth-seeking
and self-government deliberations."); Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1114 (arguing that
compelled speech harms the interests of free expression by confusing the people about the
actual strength and popularity of the substantive positions favored by the government).
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speech.7  If the state bar is able to use money collected from all its
dues payers without extra administrative burdens to protect objectors,
it will have more resources with which to advocate and spread its
message in the name of the union. The greater amount of speech
might suggest that the bar's views are more popular and powerful than
they in fact are. Further, compelling an individual to support the
organization's speech reduces the amount of money that individual has
for her own expression, reducing the level of her own speech.'
7 6
The danger is that government, by choosing the speech that will
be funded and heard, will favor some speakers, subject matters, and
viewpoints over others, distorting the marketplace. 77  One
commentator suggests that the threshold focus in the compelled speech
inquiry should be whether the government's purpose in compelling
support for a given message is to manipulate the marketplace of
ideas.'
C Limiting the Category of CompelledExpression
It is imperative that the category of unconstitutional compelled
expression-those situations in which the objector's right is
triggered-not extend too far. The compelled speech doctrine, to the
extent it prohibits government-mandated utterance, presentation, or
support of private expression, rests on a strong and significant
theoretical concern for individual liberty interests. 9 But there are-
and should be-times in which the political branches of government
act as honest agents in support of free speech, facilitating and
promoting public discourse, enhancing the ability of private speakers
175. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that restrictions
on the amount of money that a group can spend on communication "necessarily reduces the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
exploration, and the size of the audience reached").
176. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 27 (discussing argument that "compelled financial
extractions deplete the economic resources of the payor and thereby diminish his expressive
capacity"). But see Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 470 (1997) ("The
fact that an economic regulation may indirectly lead to a reduction in a handler's individual
advertising budget does not itself amount to a restriction on speech.").
177. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 29 (suggesting that, by reinforcing some private
institutions, "aggregate expressive and political power accrues to the benefited institutions");
Redish & Kessler, supra note 125, at 568 ("[G]ovemment could choose to fund only those
viewpoints with which it agreed, thereby dramatically skewing public debate and
undermining First Amendment principles.").
178. SeeJacobs, supra note 7, at 183.
179. See EMERSON, supra note 17, at 30 ("Forcing public expression of a belief is an
affront to personal integrity."); see also supra notes 153-166 and accompanying text.
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to make their messages heard, and furthering individual liberty
interests.18°
Most obviously, government collects and expends taxes, fees,
assessments, and other mandatory payments to establish, maintain, and
provide forums dedicated to private expression.18 ' The public forum
doctrine, one commentator argues, derives from the most basic
mythological image of free speech: "an agitated but eloquent speaker
standing on a soap box at Speakers' Comer, railing against injustices
committed by the government, whose agents are powerless to keep the
audience from hearing the speaker's damning words."'82
Public forums, and access to public forums, are essential to
preserving individual liberty, democracy, and an open society, all of
which can flourish only if citizens are "free to speak Truth to Power."'83
In fact, democratic government is obligated to provide such forums for
private speakers and for private expression to ensure that people can
speak and be heard, that there is broad, open dialogue, and that the
greatest amount of expression is disseminated.'84 Every community,
180. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 1366 ("The permissible range of government action
is different when it promotes speech, rather than restricts it.").
181. See EMERSON, supra note 17, at 645 ("One important way in which the
government can affirmatively promote a system of freedom of expression is by making
available to individuals and groups the facilities for engaging in expression."); BeVier, supra
note 169, at 103-04 (arguing that under the Enhancement Model, the Public Forum Doctrine
demands that government give effect to the broad affirmative command of the First
Amendment); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 456 ("[W]here the government creates and structures
a public forum, its speech-conscious action may serve rather than thwart free speech clause
values."); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 176 ("[C]reating a public forum to promote diverse
expression should be viewed as a justification that can meet strict review."); Kamenshine,
supra note 23, at 110 ("[W]hen government provides a forum without requiring payment, this
is a form of subsidization.").
182. Gey, supra note 12, at 1538.
183. Id.; see also BAKER, supra note 153, at 170-71 (arguing that the individual liberty
interests underlying free speech mandate that government provide opportunities for
expressive activities); SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 208 ("It is vital that an open culture
recognize many of these traditional public forums.").
184. See BAKER, supra note 153, at 170 ("[T]he government must exhibit at least a
minimal concern for people's freedom of assembly and expression-a mandate surely
consistent with the constitutional status of these expressive activities."); SMOLLA, supra note
153, at 208 (arguing that, in a democracy, "[e] very city, village, and hamlet in the nation
should have at least one central gathering point that is treated as a traditional public forum");
id at 209 (arguing that government must provide "green spaces" of discourse); BeVier, supra
note 169, at 101 (arguing that the Enhancement Model of the First Amendment "sometimes
imposes affirmative duties on government to maximize the opportunities for expression,"
such as through the creation of public forums); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1402
(arguing that inclusion of streets and parks as public forums "helps to satisfy the requirement
in a democratic society that all individuals have some de minimis opportunity for expressing
their views freely"); Gey, supra note 12, at 1538-39 ("The larger reality behind the myth of
the debate on the public street-corner is that every culture must have venues in which citizens
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regardless of size, must establish-through government expenditure of
compelled taxes and other payments to the public fisc-at least one
"First Amendment 'free-fire zone,"' locations or programs in which
the First Amendment applies with undiminished force.' That
commitment carries with it the additional obligation to create new
forums (by expending public moneys) when existing government-
owned property, such as parks and sidewalks, are insufficient to satisfy
the free speech needs of the community. '
Moreover, because the paradigm of compelled expression has
changed, so have the interests that must be balanced in the compelled-
expression equation.'87 In Wooley and Barnette, the constitutional
problem arose because government compelled an individual to utter or
display the government's message."' The Barnette Court emphasized
that the sole conflict was between the government and the rights of the
individual; the refusal of one individual to present the government's
message did not interfere with or deny the rights of others to do so. '
In the more recent and subtle cases, government compelled private
presentation of, or financial support for, the speech of some private
third-party speaker.9 A third liberty interest, that of the beneficiary of
can confront each other's ideas and ways of thinking about the world."); id. at 1538 (arguing
that the public forum doctrine is a mechanism to effectuate the First Amendment's broad
command to protect speech from government interference); Greene, supra note 17, at 66-67
(arguing for an understanding of government's speech power that ensures the robustness and
equality of speech commons); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 176 (arguing that government's
creation of a public forum to promote diverse expression satisfies strict scrutiny).
185. SeOSMOLLA, supranote 153, at 211.
186. BAKER, supra note 153, at 171 (arguing that in locations in which weather may
prevent outdoor expressive activity, government cannot ban expressive activities in
appropriate indoor locations, such as an auditorium); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at
1409 ("[T]he needs of individuals for free speech opportunities in a modern society have not
been fully satisfied by the traditional public forum.").
187. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 102 ("[C]ontemporary settings of coerced
expression are generally less dramatic and more complex.").
188. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding that a state's interest
in disseminating its own message "cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for such message"); W Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compelled flag salute and pledge "invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit" protected by the First Amendment); Gard, supra note 27, at 318-19 ("It is
simply contrary to the democratic premise of the first amendment to allow the government to
compel the unconsenting to use their person or privately owned property as a 'mobile
billboard' for the State's ideological message." (internal quotation omitted)); supra notes 23-
43 and accompanying text.
189. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630; Curtis, supra note 27, at xxxii; Gard, supra note 27,
at 293.
190. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
559 (1995) (defining the issue as whether private citizens who organize a parade may be
required by government to include among the marchers a private group imparting a message
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the compulsion-the private speaker whose message will be
disseminated with the aid of the government mandate-must be added
to the balance of interests, perhaps altering the outcome of that balance
in some circumstances.
A broadly applied right to object to compelled presentation or
financial support of a message or messenger, while protecting the
liberty interests of the compelled speaker, reduces the sum total of
expression. It inhibits the ability of the benefiting speakers (the
expressive recipients of the benefits of the compulsion) to get out their
messages or imposes financial and administrative burdens on the
dissemination of that message. In Hurley, GLIB will be deprived of its
most advantageous opportunity to present its message, the widely
attended and watched St. Patrick's Day Parade, absent the compelled
opportunity to march.'9' A labor union obligated to refund dues
payments to some compelled payers will have less money to spend on
expression and must establish complicated administrative mechanisms
to provide refunds and to oversee its collection and expenditures for
expressive activities.192 Fewer speakers will be heard in the public
forum if government is forced to refund moneys whenever certain
objectionable speakers use the resources of that forum; the forum
operates with decreased funds and increased administrative hassles.
These hassles might compel government simply to shut down the
forum, depriving private speakers of their best opportunity for
expression.'93
that the organizers do not wish to convey); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990)
(involving individuals compelled to join and pay dues to an integrated state bar, which
attempts to finance ideological and political activities with the collected dues); supra notes
44-112 and accompanying text.
191. SeeHurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
192. Alternatively, a union or other organization could establish a separate fund to
which contributions from members are voluntary and speak only through the resources from
that fund. But this removes the organization's voice from the debate altogether; any
expression is not that of the organization but of some particular subset of the organization's
members. Compare Brudney, supra note 78, at 272 (arguing for segregated funds as an
acceptable means of protecting dissenting shareholders), with Redish & Wasserman, supra
note 77, at 279 (arguing, with respect to corporations, that speech through the corporation's
segregated fund is that of a subgroup of the corporation, not the corporation itself).
193. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1427 ("The Aboodprecedent requires a
remedial means that is unworkable because any system requiring optional fees or a way for
students to opt out from paying for specified activities would be disruptive and expensive and
thus ineffective."); see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217, 232 (2000) ("The First Amendment does not require the University to put the program at
risk."); infra notes 342-352 and accompanying text.
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This is not to suggest that cases such as Hurley or Keller or
Abood were wrongly decided-they were not.'94 Nor is it to suggest
that government should have power to invade individual interests by
compelling people to utter messages they do not wish to utter or to
provide financial support for private speakers and messages they do
not wish to support-it should not.
This is to suggest that we sharply and narrowly define when an
individual is, in fact, being compelled to utter or support private
speech, so government may at certain times act as an honest agent
facilitating broad public discourse by private speakers. As a rule,
exceptions to the broadest dissemination of the greatest amount of
speech, and any doctrine that will reduce the total amount of
expression, must be "narrow, clear-cut, precise, and readily
controlled."'95 What we define as compelled expression similarly must
be narrow, clear-cut, and precise; not every compelled payment from
an individual that ultimately may result in private speech qualifies as
compelled expression. This balances the liberty interests of compelled
payers with the interests of willing expressive recipients of those
payments, ensuring the dissemination of the greatest amount of speech
within First Amendment bounds.' 
9 6
We must establish limiting principles to define those
circumstances in which the objector's right will be triggered. One
important limiting principle already discussed is that taxpayers and
other compelled funders cannot object to taxes and other mandatory
payments made to a governmental entity, when used by government
either for its own speech or for its own nonexpressive activities.'97 We
consider several others.
194. But see Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1433-34 (arguing that it is "just
barely conceivable" that union membership entails support of the union message and that the
objector's right should carry if there is risk of attribution to the payer); id. at 1427 (arguing
that Aboodhas been criticized because it is impossible to distinguish, in principle, fi'om other,
more pervasive ways in which individuals are taxed to support policies they abhor); Cantor,
supra note 11, at 45-46 (suggesting an alternative, looser test for evaluating union
expenditures).
195. See EMERSON, supra note 17, at 10 (arguing that the system of free expression
must rest on the broadest protections and any narrow exceptions must be "clear-cut, precise,
and readily controlled").
196. See REDISH, supra note 153, at 55 (arguing for balancing with a "thumb on the
scales" in favor of speech); supra notes 169-178 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 113-152 and accompanying text.
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1. Funds Used for Expression
There is universal agreement that the activities funded by
compelled payments must be expressive in order for objectors to state
First Amendment claims. "By definition government cannot infringe
upon individual interests by compelling expression unless what it
compels constitutes expression."' 98 The liberty interest in individual
conscience protected by the prohibition on compelled support for
expression does not extend beyond situations in which the activities
immediately and purposefully funded with compelled moneys are, in
and of themselves, speech. For this reason, objections to government's
ideologically objectionable nonexpressive activities, such as waging
war or providing reproductive health services, are not constitutionally
cognizable.'
This distinction between funding expressive and nonexpressive
activities is the key to Wileman Bros. The Court there explained that
Aboodrecognized only a right not to be compelled to contribute to an
organization's expressive activities that conflict with one's freedom of
belief, not a right not to be compelled to provide financial support for
an organization that happens to conduct expressive activities." Where
the expressive activity comprises only a small portion of the range of
nonexpressive activities engaged in with compelled funds, the program
must be understood as nonexpressive, such that payers may not object
to any uses of their funds."' This was precisely how the Court in
United Foods distinguished Wileman Bros. and held that a different
statutory program, funding only generic advertising with no
198. Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1010.
199. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 23 ("Yet such affronts to conscience through forced
monetary support of government have never been deemed to be significant first amendment
impingements."); see also Redish & Wasserman, supra note 77, at 276 (arguing that corporate
shareholders often must subsidize nonexpressive corporate activities, such as operating with
low-wage laborers in foreign countries, which shareholders may find ideologically
objectionable).
200. SeeGlickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997).
201. See id. at 469 (discussing "assessments used to fund collective advertising,
together with other collective activities"); id. (stressing the importance of the statutory
context, in which the objecting funders act as "part of a broader collective enterprise in which
their freedom to act independently is already constrained by the regulatory scheme"); id. at
475 ("The basic policy decision that underlies the entire statute rests on an assumption that in
the volatile markets for agricultural commodities the public will be best served by compelling
cooperation among producers in making economic decisions that would be made
independently in a free market."); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 174 (arguing that Wileman Bros.
suggests that forced contributions, even for expression, will be constitutional if germane to
the presumably nonspeech purposes for the compulsion); supra notes 88-102 and
accompanying text.
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complementary nonexpressive activities, triggered free speech interests
and could not use objecting payers' moneys to fund those activities. °2
Thus, where private activities funded through government-mandated
payments are entirely (or perhaps primarily) nonexpressive, First
Amendment strictures will not apply and the rights of objecting payers
will not be triggered.
2. Disagreement with the Message Funded
Another potential limiting principle would be a requirement that
the objector disagree with the message that she is forced to utter or
financially support. Commentators properly reject such a limitation
because the existence of an objector's claim should not turn on the
presence or absence of disagreement with the compelled message. 3
The right at issue is the right to refrain from speaking, grounded
in the individual's liberty interest in both her self-perception and self-
presentation." The infringement on those interests results from the
compulsion to speak or to pay for the speech of others, regardless of
the compelled message and regardless of whether the compelled
speaker or payer disagrees with that message.0 5 It is true that the
Court has noted and emphasized the presence of substantive
disagreement with the compelled message in several cases.06 It also is
202. See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 412-413 (2001) (emphasizing
the missing features, including the fact that almost all the funds collected were used for
generic advertising, that there were no marketing orders regulating the sale or production of
mushrooms, and no industry exemption from antitrust laws); id. at 415 ("[H]ere the statute
does not require group action, save to generate the very speech to which some handlers
object."); id ("[T]he compelled contributions for advertising are not part of some broader
regulatory scheme."); supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
203. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1005 ("Whether or not the individual agrees with
the views he is required to express, and whether or not others perceive his coerced expression
as sincere make no difference."); see also Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 489 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("What counts here, then, is not whether respondents fail to disagree with the
generalized message of the generic ads that California fruit is good, but that they do indeed
deny that the general message is as valuable and worthy of their support as more particular
claims about the merits of their own brands."); W Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 634-35 (1943) (suggesting that the right to object does not turn on the objector
possessing particular views).
204. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1004-05 (grounding the protection against forced
expression in an individual's ability to control her presentation to the world and in her
individual conscience); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that
the right not to speak is a component of individual freedom of mind); supra notes 157-163
and accompanying text.
205. SeeGaebler, supranote 7, at 1005.
206. See, e.g., United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410-11 ("First Amendment concerns apply
here because of the requirement that producers subsidize speech with which they disagree.");
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995) ("[T]he
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true that the injury to such interests will be greater when the message
foisted upon a person is offensive or objectionable."7
One presumably would be less likely to object either to uttering a
message with which one agrees or to supporting the expressive
activities of an organization with which one agrees; perhaps the
constitutional challenge does not arise in the absence of disagreement.
If, for example, the organizers of the South Boston St. Patrick's Day
Parade did not object to GLIB'S message, they would not have
attempted to bar the group's banner from the parade in the first place.0 8
But that is not tantamount to suggesting that disagreement is the
sine qua non of the free speech right. Such a state-of-mind
requirement is properly understood as a make-weight, a point
strengthening the Court's analysis, without becoming a necessary
condition on the right."'9 For example, it is unlikely that the Maynards
would have lost their case if they simply did not wish to promote the
state slogan on their car, regardless of whether they found the message
"Live Free or Die" morally objectionable." ' Similarly, a requirement
that an individual give money directly to some private expressive
organization, even when she has complete freedom to choose an
organization mirroring her ideas and desired messages, nevertheless
invades her interests in controlling the time and content of the
messages she presents to the world.21'
Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like from the communication it chose
to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape its expression by
speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another."); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 ("The
First Amendment protects the right of individuals to ... refuse to foster, in the way New
Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.").
207. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 115 ("Of course, where a party is compelled
to utter, display, subsidize, or facilitate an opposed political or religious message, the
government's action is especially objectionable."); Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1118
("The publicly humiliating and personally degrading effects may be even greater when
private individuals are called upon actually to mouth words and thoughts which they find
abhorrent.").
208. Moreover, the parade organizers likely agreed with some portion of GLIB's
message, the part about being Irish and proud of their Irish heritage. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at
561,570.
209. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 115 ("[I]t is not surprising that the Court
would allude to such disagreement where it exists.").
210. See id. at 115-16 ("Nor is it reasonable to suppose that after Wooley, a motorist
could be compelled to display a state's motto as long as he or she agreed with, or was at least
neutral as to its sentiment."); id. at 115 (arguing that the flag salute could not be imposed on a
student who admitted to agreeing with the sentiments of the Pledge of Allegiance, but chose
not to make her sentiments public by reciting it).
211. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 115 ("[I]t is hard to imagine that the ... Court
would have upheld a requirement that during a presidential election, each person must
contribute to the candidate or party of his or her choice.").
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The exception to this understanding is Wileman Bros., where the
Court emphasized that the central message of the generic advertising
was "designed to serve the producers' and handlers' common interest"
and that "it is fair to presume that they agree with the central message
of the speech."2 '2 In other words, because the objecting funders could
not have disagreed with the message of the generic advertisements,
they did not have a valid First Amendment claim.
But Wleman Bros. marks a sharp doctrinal departure, arguably
taking a step towards undoing all protection against compelled funding
of private expression."3 The decision contradicted the statement in
Hurley, just two years earlier, that there need not be any articulable
message presented for an objector to challenge the compulsion.14 If
there need not be any clear and articulable message, there need not be
disagreement with any message for an objecting payer to challenge a
funding requirement. In any event, the Court apparently backed away
from this notion in United Foods, stating that it is enough that the
objecting payer wishes to present a different message, even if she does
not entirely disavow the message to be supported by the compelled
payments.
215
3. Public Connection Between the Funder and the Message
A third possible limiting factor is a requirement that the
compelled speaker be linked publicly with the compelled message or
messenger. This is not an issue in cases involving compelled
presentation or utterance of a message, where the link will be readily
apparent. The nexus concern arises only in compelled funding cases,
where the connection between the speech of the organization and the
single compelled payer will not always be clear.
Some commentators have been explicit in demanding this
element. Professor Cantor argues that the "critical issue for first
amendment purposes is whether the payor is required to associate with
or appear to endorse in some fashion a distasteful cause selected by the
212. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457,462,470 (1997).
213. See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
214. See Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 488-89 (Souter, J., dissenting).
215. See United States v United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 411 (2001) (stating that plaintiff
"wants to convey the message that its brand of mushrooms is superior to those grown by
other producers," as opposed to the message "that mushrooms are worth consuming whether
or not they are branded"); id ("[Tihere is no apparent principle which distinguishes out of
hand minor debates about whether a branded mushroom is better than just any mushroom.");
see also Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. at 489 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is enough that
one "merely wishes to support a different act of expression").
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government."'216 Professors Bezanson and Buss echo this view, arguing
that the real question "should be whether the government places a
person in such a relationship with objectionable ideas that a reasonable
observer will see the ideas as that person i own.2 7  Similarly,
Professor Gaebler argues that an infringement on free speech interests
is established only when the individual somehow is identified with
some message."'  He envisions a continuum. As the compelled
expression becomes less personal and less direct, the payer's
association with the message diminishes and it becomes less likely that
she or any listeners will ascribe the views expressed to her."9
"Eventually a point is reached where the level of personal involvement
is so minimal and the resulting nexus between the individual and the
message so remote that no legally cognizable infringement of negative
first amendment interests occurs.""2
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment in Southworth and
finding no compelled speech problem, distinguished Aboodand Keller
precisely because the relationship between the fee payer and the
ultimately objectionable expression was far more attenuated than in
those earlier cases.' In the earlier cases, the individual had been
required to join or at least pay money directly to the very organization
presenting objectionable messages; the "connection between the
forced contributor and the ultimate message was as direct as the
unmediated contribution to the organization doing the speaking. 22
This suggests that the presence or absence of some nexus or
identification between individual and organizational message will
make a difference in the outcome of compelled funder cases.
In fact, such a nexus should not be necessary; "the central point is
that compelled subsidization is objectionable even if there is no
identification between the contributor and the subsidized
expression."23 The right at issue is to refrain from speaking and the
216. Cantor, supra note 11, at 25.
217. Bezanson & Buss, supa note 11, at 1433.
218. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1011; id. at 1023 ("[T]here can be no infringement
of individual interests unless compliance with a government requirement somehow identifies
the individual with a message or point of view.").
219. Seeid at 1013-14.
220. See id. at 1014; see also id. at 1022-23 (arguing that the AboodCourt correctly
held that payments for ideological speech violated these free speech interests and that the
Court correctly held that this interest was outweighed for some issues by the interest in
maintaining agency shops).
221. 529 U.S. 217, 240 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
222. See id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
223. Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 116.
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sole point is that an individual should not be forced to support private
speech. That protection is abridged by the very requirement that the
individual do so, regardless of any connection to the message that
might or might not be apparent to a reasonable listener. The point of
the protection is that, while an individual cannot stop a private speaker
from presenting an offensive message, she may decline to pay for it in
most circumstances.
224
Moreover, Professor Gaebler's own model commands that no
nexus to the ultimate message is required. The dignitary interest in
freedom of conscience rests on an inward focus on the individual's
own mind-her self-perception and internal feelings of powerlessness,
shame, and disgrace from her inability to remain silent as a result of
the government compulsion.225 Professor Gaebler concedes that a
compulsion to support some idea causes feelings of humiliation, even
if no one else witnesses or knows of the payer's actions.26 If the very
requirement of supporting private speech requires a submission of
mind and impinges that internal vision of self-by preventing the
payer from controlling the messages that she enables-her freedom of
conscience is violated, regardless of whether or not the world or a
reasonable person perceives a nexus between payer and a particular
message. Moreover, cognitive dissonance, resulting from involuntary
internalization and adoption of the government-mandated message, is
an entirely personal, internal subconscious process of confusion.
Such dissonance is unaffected by how the reasonable outside world
views or understands the message and the individual's connection to it.
III. A LIMITING TEST FOR COMPELLED EXPRESSION
We incorporate aspects of these limiting principles into a three-
part model for determining when an objecting payer's right has been
triggered. This test properly and sufficiently cabins the breadth of
what we understand as compelled support for expression, ensuring that
the greatest amount of speech is disseminated, striking a proper
224. Cf Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 595-96 & n.2 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Avant-garde artistes such as respondents remain
entirely free to 6paterles bourgeois, they are merely deprived of the additional satisfaction of
having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it." (internal footnote omitted)).
225. SeeGaebler, supranote 7, at 1005-06; see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
714 (1977) (stating that the right to refrain from speaking is a component of the individual
freedom of mind); supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
226. See Gaebler, supra note 7, at 1006.
227. See Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1114; supra notes 161-163 and
accompanying text.
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balance, and protecting the interests in individual liberty underlying
the First Amendment right not to speak.
First, we examine who receives the compelled funds-who is the
immediate, direct, and designated recipient of the compelled
payments. The objector's right exists only where the recipient is the
ultimate speaker; no right is triggered where that recipient is the
government.228 Second, we look to the immediate, direct, intended, and
designated use of those funds. A payer has a free speech objection
only if the immediate use of the compelled funds is expressive, only if
the funds leave the payer's hands and go directly for purposes or
activities that may be understood as, in and of themselves, speech.229
Third, the payments by the funders to the private speaker must be
compelled or coerced by government, mandated by law or other fiat;
absent that compulsion, no free speech right is implicated. 3°
The question, in short, is whether the compelled payer is required
by the government to pay money directly to, or for the express benefit
of, a private recipient for use by that recipient for expressive activities.
The focus must be on where the money goes immediately after it
leaves the payer's hands and for what purpose; that is, whether money
is paid by the funder either directly to a speaker or to the government
but earmarked for immediate transfer to a specific, known, identified
speaker. Such funds must be used for expressive activities. Where
money is paid to government generally, or alternatively, where funds
are used for nonexpressive purposes, the payer has no First
Amendment right to object to the compelled payment or the uses of
that payment. Moreover, unlike Woodward and Bernstein, we do not
"follow the money."3' We do not look beyond the initial transfer of
money from the compelled payer to the immediate recipient and the
initial use of those funds. Any speech that might occur farther down
the road with the help of, or as a result of, the funds transferred in that
initial compelled payment is irrelevant to the objector's right.
228. See supra notes 113-152 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
230. SeeUnited States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001) ("[A] threshold
inquiry must be whether there is some state imposed obligation which makes group
membership less than voluntary .... ); Cantor, supra note 11, at 19 ("A first amendment
violation would not seem to arise without government prescription of a message or forced
identification with, or affirmation of, a message by the payor.").
231. See ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (MGM 1974) (depicting conversation between
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward and confidential informant Deep Throat, in which
Deep Throat tells Woodward to "follow the money" in uncovering the connection between the
Watergate burglary and the Nixon White House).
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This analysis defeats the objector's right in the absence of a close
nexus between the individual payer and some private expression by the
recipient of the funds. This is not equivalent to requiring a public
nexus between the forced contributor and a specific, articulable
message or point of view, which is irrelevant to the constitutional
injury.232 The focus instead is on a direct connection between the funds
and speech, some expressive activity. If that connection is lacking
because the uses of the money are not speech or because the
immediate recipient of the funds is not a speaker, the payer's First
Amendment interests are not implicated. However, if the thing funded
is expressive, the payer's interests are implicated, whether or not the
payer is publicly linked to the content of that expression.
This is a two-step analysis. An objecting payer first must satisfy
all three elements of this model in order for her First Amendment
interests to be triggered. If she meets all three elements, we next
consider whether she prevails on her claim; in the funding context, this
means applying the germaneness analysis of Lelner Keller, and
Abood to determine if the expressive use of the compelled funds is
constitutionally permissible.23 If the payer does not satisfy all three
elements, the objector's right never was triggered, the inquiry ends at
the first step, and the compelled payment program survives
constitutional scrutiny.
This model justifies the outcomes of some prior compelled
funding situations. For example, in Keller, the plaintiffs were
compelled by law to join and pay dues directly to the state bar, which
used those dues to fund its own expressive ideological and political
activities." To the extent that some of the Bar's activities were
nonexpressive-examining applicants for admission to practice,
disciplining members for misconduct, formulating rules of
professional conduct, and studying changes in court procedures 2 -the
objecting dues payers' rights were not triggered. To the extent that the
funded actions were expressive-lobbying or litigating on a range of
contested political and social issues-the objecting dues payers' rights
232. See supm notes 216-227 and accompanying text.
233. See Jacobs, supm note 7, at 174 ("[C]ontributions, even for speech, may be
constitutional if germane to the (presumptively nonspeech) purpose for the compulsion.");
see also Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 484 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("[G]overnment retains its full power to regulate commercial transactions directly,
despite elements of speech and association inherent in such transactions."); supra notes 56-
112 and accompanying text.
234. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
235. Seeid. at5.
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were triggered, requiring consideration of which of those expressive
activities were germane to its purposes and could be paid for with dues
from objecting members.236
In United Foods, the objector's right was triggered because the
industry assessments mandated by the government were paid directly
from industry members to the Mushroom Council, and the Council
used the funds exclusively for product advertising, an expressive
activity.21' Turning to the second step, the program was invalid because
the Mushroom Council's sole purpose was the creation of generic
advertising, meaning that the compelled expression was not germane
to any nonexpressive purpose independent of the speech itself.
28
Finally, in the corporate speech context, although shareholders
pay money directly to the corporation and the corporation uses those
moneys for its expressive activities, government never compels
individuals to pay money to that corporation. 2"9  The compelled-
shareholder argument fails on the absence of actual government
compulsion.
By contrast, in Wileman Bros., tree-fruit industry members paid
assessments to committees of industry members appointed by the
Secretary of Agriculture, which funds were used for a variety of
expressive and nonexpressive activities, pursuant to marketing orders
issued by the Secretary through the committees."' Our model partially
explains the result because the funded activities primarily were
nonexpressive, involving a range of collective nonexpressive industry
economic and commercial activities, pursuant to a broad federal
regulatory scheme that constrained independent commercial activity."'
Such nonexpressive use of compelled funds would not trigger the
rights of the objecting payers."'
236. Seeidat5, 15-16.
237. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,408 (2001).
238. See id. at 415-17; id. at 415 (rejecting notion that speech may be germane to
itself).
239. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
240. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457,461-62 (1997).
241. See id. at 468-69; see also United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415 (distinguishing
Wileman Bros. because the mushroom subsidies do "not require group action, save to
generate the very speech to which some handlers object").
242. This is not to endorse the analysis or outcome in Wileman Bros., because the
majority erred with its all-or-nothing approach. The Court should have analyzed the
Committee's expressive expenditures separately from its nonexpressive expenditures, as it did
in the earlier union and organization cases. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
The Court should have recognized that the plaintiffs' rights were triggered by the
expenditures for generic advertising; payers were compelled by federal law to give money to
the Committee, which used the money for expressive activities. The Court then should have
209
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IV OBJECTORS' RIGHTS INA NEW CONTEXT,
Into this doctrinal and theoretical mix came five students from
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who argued that their free
speech rights were infringed by the University's use of their mandatory
student activities fees to fund private student organizations engaging in
political and ideological expression.243 An objecting payer's claim in
this context was not entirely new; several commentators have analyzed
the issue of mandatory student fees at public universities as a
compelled-expression concern, reaching varied conclusions.2"
Southworth became the most visible of these cases.
A. Background andLower Courts
The University of Wisconsin required all full-time students to pay
a mandatory (students could not receive their grades or diplomas if the
fees were unpaid) student activities fee, of approximately $165 per
semester.24' A portion of the fees was placed in a common fund
controlled and administered by the student government and distributed
to a range of registered student organizations and community-based
service organizations for their extracurricular activities, many of which
were expressive, political, and ideological in nature. 46
Registered student organizations obtained funds in any of three
ways. First, and most common, the organization received money from
the Student Government Activity Fund, which could be used to support
operations, events, and travel expenses central to the organization's
purpose.247 Second, approximately fifteen organizations obtained
funds from the General Student Services Fund for on-campus services
proceeded to the second step, of whether those expenditures, although expressive,
nevertheless were germane to the organization's primarily nonspeech purposes so as to be
permissible.
243. SeeBd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 226-27
(2000); Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F3d 717, 718-19 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Calvert, supra
note 167, at 69-70; Jacobs, supra note 11, at 440-41.
244. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 48 (arguing that the use of mandatory fees by
private student groups was permissible, as long as the funds were "available on an equivalent
basis to any student group satisfying neutral criteria,' the group performed a "neutral service
function," and the "funded group's activities [were] primarily directed to a student audience");
Jacobs, supra note 11, at 442 (noting the conflicting results reached by lower courts in
previous mandatory student fees cases).
245. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 222; Grebe, 151 F3d at 719.
246. See Grebe, 151 E3d at 719-20; Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1423;
Calvert, supra note 167, at 69-70.
247. See South worth, 529 U.S. at 223-24; Calvert, supra note 167, at 69.
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and for political and ideological activities.248 Third, an organization
could have its funding approved by a referendum vote of the student
body.249 Organizations generally received funds on a reimbursement
basis, submitting invoices and receipts to the university for expenses
incurred, rather than in a lump-sum payment in advance of the
expenditures.25 °
It was undisputed that the program distributed funds to the
organizations in an entirely viewpoint-neutral manner. 5' Nevertheless,
the complaining students objected to any portion of their fees going to
eighteen organizations that engaged in political and ideological
activities that conflicted with their politically conservative, Christian
beliefs. 52 The objectionable groups included, among others, the
Wisconsin Public Interest Research Group; the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
Campus Center; the International Socialist Organization; and Amnesty
International." The students sought either a pro rata refund of the
money that went to these groups or the opportunity to designate in
advance those organizations to which they did not want to give any
portion of their moneys. 4
The district court concluded that the University could not force
objecting students to fund private organizations that engage in political
and ideological activities, speech, and advocacy; the court enjoined the
use of the objectors' fees to fund those groups and required the
university to establish an opt-out system.5 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court of appeals first
determined that the Supreme Court had instructed it as to the proper
analysis, in dicta in Rosenberger v Rector & Visitors of University of
Virgii a2 6 where the Court noted that the precise issue of student
payers objecting to funding a student activities fund was not before it
and cited to Keller and Abood5 7  From this single sentence, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had "directed" it
248. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 224; Grebe, 151 E3d at 720.
249. SeeSouthworth, 529 U.S. at 224; Grebe, 151 E3d at 720; Calvert, supranote 167,
at 69.
250. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 225.
251. See id. at 234; Calvert, supra note 167, at 70.
252. See Grebe, 151 E3d at 720; Calvert, supra note 167, at 70.
253. See Grebe, 151 E3d at 720-21; Calvert, supra note 167, at 70.
254. See Grebe, 151 E3d at 718.
255. Seeid. at718, 722.
256. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that the University violated the First Amendment
by denying a student organization access to money from student activities fund).
257. See Grebe, 151 E3d at 722 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840).
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and "led" it to the KelledAbood analysis for use when that issue did
arise.
258
The court of appeals then applied the three-part germaneness
analysis formalized in Lehnert.2 9 The University argued that funding
expressive student organizations was germane to education because
the funding program permitted more diverse expression on campus."'
But the court held that germaneness could not be construed so broadly
as to include the forced funding of private political speech within the
concept of education.16' Any educational benefit that students might
derive from such private political speech was incidental and secondary
to the primary goal of the funded organization, the promotion of its
ideological beliefs.262 Such incidental educational benefit did not
justify infringing on the First Amendment rights of the dissenting
students.263 The court also emphasized that most private student
organizations did not even apply for funding, suggesting that funding
is not even germane to the existence and activities of the organizations,
much less to education. 2' The funding of such private expression with
mandatory fees could not be germane to this constricted view of the
University's interest in education.
Second, the court found no "vital policy interests of the
government" that could justify the use of compelled fees in this
manner.2 65  There was no "common cause" between the private
organizations engaging in speech and the objecting students who were
funding them, as with the collective bargaining goals of a labor
union.266 Nor was there a free-rider problem, because the private
organizations that the plaintiffs objected to funding did not act in a
representative capacity for the students and much of the organizations'
expressive activities provided no benefit to the objecting students.67
258. Seeid. at 722-23.
259. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991); see supra notes 73-76
and accompanying text.
260. See Grebe, 151 E3d at 724.
261. Seeld
262. See id; id at 726 (stating that any training an organization provides its student
members is secondary to the stated objective of a "frankly ideological bent") (quoting Galda
v. Rutgers, 772 E2d 1060, 1065 (3d Cir. 1985)).
263. See id at 726.
264. See id at 725.
265. See id at 727.
266. Seeid at 727-28.
267. Seeid at 728; see also Cantor, supra note 11, at 48 (emphasizing the requirement
that only on-campus activities should be exempt from an objector's challenge).
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B. Southworth in the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed."' Justice Kennedy,
writing for six justices, began by emphasizing that the University had
exacted the mandatory fees "for the sole purpose of facilitating the free
and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students."269
Nevertheless, the objecting students were entitled to insist upon certain
operational safeguards with respect to the expressive activities they
were compelled to fund.27
The student activities fund, the Court said emphatically, is "not a
public forum in the traditional sense of the term"27' But public forum
cases were "instructive here by close analogy" in establishing a
standard of protection, even though public forum cases typically
involve claims for access to the forum, not objections to funding it."'
The requirement of viewpoint neutrality, controlling in public forum
cases, also was sufficient to protect the rights of objecting students.273
The KellenAbood germaneness standard, on which the lower
courts had relied, was "neither applicable nor workable in the context
of extracurricular student speech at a university."27'  The Court
recognized that the mandatory fees infringed on the speech and beliefs
of the compelled student funders, but found that the germaneness
standard "becomes all the more unmanageable in the public university
setting, particularly where the State undertakes to stimulate the whole
universe of speech and ideas."27 ' The Court stressed the vast range of
speech that the university sought to encourage and enable and the
university's power to determine that "its mission is well served if
students have the means to engage in dynamic discussions of
philosophical, religious, scientific, social, and political subjects"
beyond the four walls of the lecture hall. 76
The requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the funding system
became the operational principle and the proper measure of protection
268. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 219 (2000).
269. See id. at 229; see also Calvert, supra note 167, at 73-74 (summarizing majority
opinion).
270. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
271. See id. at 230.
272. Seeid. at 229-30.
273. Seeid. at 230, 233-34.
274. Id. at 230; see also id. at 231 ("The standard of germane speech as applied to
student speech at a university is unworkable .... ).
275. Id. at 232 ("It is not for the Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to
be pursued in an institution of higher learning.").
276. Seeid.at233.
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for objecting students. 77 Because the parties had stipulated that the
main funding program was viewpoint neutral, the program was
consistent with the First Amendment."8 However, the Court expressed
reservations about the referendum portion of the program and
remanded for further inquiry because it was not clear that this funding
mechanism was viewpoint neutral. 9  The referendum process
"substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality,"
undermining the minority views it is intended to protect.
2 0
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred
only in the judgment, suggesting that "the First Amendment interest
... here is simply insufficient to merit protection by anything more
than the viewpoint neutrality already accorded by the University."
281
The question was not whether the University was required to adhere to
viewpoint neutrality, but whether, having done so, the plaintiffs were
entitled to relief from that specific scheme.2  The concurring opinion
agreed that the main portion of the student activities fund program was
constitutionally valid.283
Justice Souter focused on how closely the circumstances of
mandatory student activity fees resembled the Court's previous
compelled speech cases, concluding that in the prior cases "the
government was imposing far more directly and offensively on an
objecting individual than collecting the fee that indirectly funds the
jumble of other speakers' messages in this case., 284  Justice Souter
agreed that Keller and Abood did not control.285  The relationship
between the fee payer and the ultimately objectionable expression was
"far more attenuated," with the student funding only a distributing
agency having no social, political, or ideological character and itself
engaging in no expression.86 Further, the challenged fees supported a
program aimed at broadening public discourse. 87
277. Seeid at233-34.
278. Seeid.at234.
279. Secid at235-36.
280. See id at 235 ("Access to a public forum, for instance, does not depend upon
majoritarian consent.").
281. Id. at 236 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
282. See id (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
283. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
284. See id. at 239-40 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id at 239
(Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the fee program did not modify any
message that the objecting student wishes to make and did not require the student to bear the
offensive message personally, let alone affirm a moral or political commitment).
285. See id at 240 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
286. See id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
287. See id at 240-41 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Finally, Justice Souter emphasized the government's interest in
education and the fact that some educational value will be derived
from the expressive activities supported by mandatory fees .2 " He
noted that this dispute occurred within the university setting, where
students inevitably are required to support the expression of personally
offensive viewpoints. "9 Course offerings, even more directly and
obviously offensive and funded by tuition payments, need not be
viewpoint neutral;2" neither should a similarly expressive extra
curricular program.
C Problems with the Court' Approach to Southworth
Commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court's decision
in Southworth reflects the triumph of the marketplace of ideas and of
the governmental interest in enabling a broad range of diverse
expression-particularly in the unique context of the university--over
the interests of objecting funders.29' Justice Kennedy's opinion
arguably suggests that, at least in some cases, the marketplace
metaphor compels rejection of an objector's claim in favor of an
enhanced and broader range of voices and ideas in the marketplace.292
The University manipulated the marketplace through the funding
program, but in a way that sought to further the "common purpose of
adjusting the relative weights of the voices in the marketplace of ideas
to promote more full dialogue and debate."293 In essence, the argument
goes, where government, particularly a university, seeks to encourage
diverse public expression, the arguments of objecting funders will
fail.29
4
288. See id. at 242 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
289. See id. at 242-43 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
290. See id. at 243 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The University need not
provide junior years abroad in North Korea as well as France, instruct in the theory of
plutocracy as well as democracy, or teach Nietzsche as well as St. Thomas.").
291. See Calvert, supra note 167, at 58 ("The bottom line, then, is that the entire
decision in Southworth can be interpreted through a basic understanding of one principle-
the privileged and well-ensconced position of the marketplace of ideas in both First
Amendment jurisprudence and, in particular, academia."); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 443 ("The
difference relied upon by the Court in rejecting application of the germaneness standard to
the student fee context is the 'vast unexplored bounds' of the speech public universities seek
to encourage.").
292. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234.
293. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 446; see Calvert, supra note 167, at 77 ("Mandatory fee
assessments ... serve to help place more ideas in the university marketplace.").
294. SeeCalvert, supra note 167, at 75-76 (arguing that South worth "signals a triumph
for the concept of tolerance within the university marketplace" and that people must
"tolerat[e] the speech of others with whom [they] may disagree"); Jacobs, supra note 11, at
215
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There are several problems with the Court's analytical model.
First, Justice Kennedy's opinion can be read not as rejecting
application of the germaneness standard of KelleiAbood, but simply
as applying that standard more liberally than did the Seventh Circuit.
According to the majority, the university possesses broad power to
define its educational mission and interest, to determine that this
mission includes dynamic discussions on a limitless range of subjects
outside the four walls of the classroom, and to impose the mandatory
fee to sustain the dialogue to those ends.29 ' It was not for the Court to
second-guess that determination of germaneness.296
But this merely restates the idea that the private speech funded by
compelled student fees is germane to the university's educational
mission and purpose, under an expansive definition of that educational
mission and purpose. In other words, the Supreme Court did not
decline to ask what speech is germane. Instead, it asked the question
and found a far broader understanding of what private expression is
germane to the unique setting of the public university.297
The Court did not grasp the real reason to completely reject the
application of the germaneness test. The university is in no way
analogous to a union or professional association and the university's
funding system is in no way analogous to the system of organization
dues. In Abood and its progeny, government required individuals to
join, or give money to, private organizations which used that money
for their own expressive purposes.298 In the student activities program,
government required individuals to give money to it, but did not
engage in any expression or in the creation of any message of its
own.299 The essential features of unions that warrant the germaneness
460 ("[T]he public purpose of creating diversity in the marketplace of ideas justifies using
public resources to pursue it.").
295. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233.
296. Seeid at 232 ("It is not for the Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas
to be pursued in an institution of higher learning.").
297. See id (stating that the University seeks to encourage discussion of "vast,
unexplored bounds" and to stimulate the universe of speech and ideas); id at 242 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("No one disputes the University's assertion that some
educational value is derived from the activities supported by the fee .... ); Bezanson & Buss,
supra note 11, at 1427 (arguing that the Court's failure to set a standard of germaneness stems
from the breadth of the university's mission).
298. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
299. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (emphasizing that the University had disclaimed
any funded speech as its own); id. at 240 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(emphasizing that students funded only the distributing agency having no social, political, or
ideological character and itself engaging in no expression of any distinct message).
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test-the representative relationship and the existence of a common
cause between the funders and the funded entity-are entirely absent.
The larger defect is the majority's emphasis on viewpoint
neutrality in the funding programs. This requirement rests on the
notion that an individual should not object to having her money
support an expressive program as long as she, or an organization to
which she belongs or supports, has equal access to the resources of the
program, the same access as the objectionable speakers have."° The
problem is that the Court never explains at what point a funding
program becomes viewpoint-discriminatory. That is, the opinion does
not explain whether the funding program must be viewpoint-
discriminatory on its face or in its actual application and operation.
This ambiguous standard is either meaningless or results in the
elimination of university activities funding programs.
On one hand, it might be enough that the program's rules and
regulations afford competing speakers equal access to the funds and
that any discretionary decisions about granting requests for funds must
be based on specific, objective, neutral criteria. Perhaps a program
that facially provides funding to all requesting organizations,
regardless of viewpoint, satisfies the objector's right. Perhaps the
objecting payer's right to challenge the program will be triggered only
if the program, on its face and in its express regulations, excludes
certain speakers or certain viewpoints."' But this amounts to no
protection at all, because a program could immunize itself from
objecting-payer attack by simply adopting viewpoint-neutral terms and
rules, without regard to how the fund actually is administered. This
cannot be the proper understanding, given the Court's stated goal of
providing meaningful safeguards for student payers."2
Logically, then, a single viewpoint-discriminatory decision, even
one made in disregard for the plain, viewpoint-neutral language of the
program regulations, is sufficient to render the program viewpoint-
discriminatory and to trigger the objector's right. Suppose that the
300. See id. at 233 ("Viewpoint neutrality is the justification for requiring the student
to pay the fee in the first instance and for ensuring the integrity of the program's operation
once the funds have been collected.").
301. Compare Southworth, 529 U.S. at 234 (stating that the parties concede that
student activities fund is viewpoint neutral), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995) (discussing a student activity fees program in which
regulations explicitly exclude religious activities).
302. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 ("[T]he objecting students may insist upon
certain safeguards with respect to the expressive activities which they are required to
support.").
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Federalist Society is denied funds to bring Kenneth Starr onto campus
for a speech, an event that should be reimbursable under the program's
regulations, while the Sierra Club and the International Socialist
Organization both receive funds for similar speaker events. The
funding program now arguably can be understood as viewpoint
discriminatory, at least in this single decision. For the Court's standard
to have any meaning, that must trigger the objector's right. Thus, a
student should be able to return to court to argue that the funding
program is not, in fact, viewpoint neutral and that she is entitled to a
refund of that portion of her fees that went to objectionable
organizations such as the Sierra Club or International Socialist
Organization. On this understanding, the Court's model blew open the
courthouse doors for an objecting payer to challenge the entire
administration of a student activities fee program on the basis of that
single, improper funding decision.
The question of disagreement with the funded message as a
prerequisite to bringing an objector's claim also looms. The
Southworth majority mentioned that the plaintiffs objected to funding
particular organizations and sought refunds of the portions of their fees
that went to eighteen specified groups with which they disagreed."3
But the Court did not explain how the issue of disagreement
determines the scope of the objector's right. This further muddies the
Court's standard, because disagreement with the funded message
should be irrelevant to the existence of a compelled speech violation. "
Assuming a single viewpoint-discriminatory denial of funds to
one group, may an objecting student opt-out from providing funds
only to those organizations with which she disagrees? Or may she opt-
out of funding any student group, regardless of its message and her
disagreement with that message? Moreover, must the objecting
student be sympathetic to the group that was denied funding in order
for her right to be triggered? Or is it enough for a student to argue that
simply because some student organization was denied funding in a
viewpoint-discriminatory fashion in a particular instance-regardless
of the group and regardless of whether her beliefs are consistent with
those of the group--she now may object to being required to fund
some or all groups?
303. See id. at 231 ("It infringes on the speech and beliefs of the individual to be
required, by this mandatory student activity fee program, to pay subsidies for the
objectionable speech of others...."); Southworth v. Grebe, 151 E3d 717, 720-21 (7th Cir.
1998) (naming the objectionable organizations and describing their activities).
304. See supm notes 203-215 and accompanying text.
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Return to the unfunded Federalist Society event. Who may
challenge this nonviewpoint-neutral programs: those students who are
active members of the Federalist Society (and who actually were
denied access), those students who are sympathetic to the Federalist
Society, or all students who simply object to funding other private
speech and speakers? And for what payments are they entitled to
refunds or opt-outs-payments to groups arguably on the other side of
the political spectrum (such as the Sierra Club) that received funds and
whose messages the payer finds objectionable, or all groups that
received funds through the program?
These questions all remain open after Southworth and nothing in
the Supreme Court's opinion indicates how they should be resolved.
The answers determine how wide the Court's opinion opens the gates
to objector's claims. But regardless of the outcome in Southworth
itself, the doors have been opened to a broad range of objecting payer
challenges to the operation of university student activities funds. And
it may be that the Court itself created a standard that could be "so
disruptive and expensive that the program to support extracurricular
speech would be ineffective," despite the Court's stated desire not to
"put the program at risk.1
305
Justice Souter criticized the majority for creating a new, but
entirely undefined, category of free speech interests.0 6 The interest
exists in a twilight zone. It is not government speaking with the funds
collected from its constituents, to which no objector's right attaches."7
Nor, according to the Court, is the program a public forum.0 This
"speaker" appears to be the funding program itself, although the
program neither forms nor presents its own message. The Court never
explains the origins or nature of this speaker. But it nevertheless
recognizes a payer's right not to fund it, in some unexplained or
undefined circumstances involving some unexplained or undefined
group of plaintiffs, if the program does not speak in a viewpoint-
neutral manner.
305. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232.
306. See id. at 236 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the majority
recognized "a new category of First Amendment interests and a new standard of viewpoint
neutrality protection").
307. See id. at 234-35 (emphasizing that the University is not speaking, but explaining
the different standard that would prevail if it were); see also supra notes 113-152 and
accompanying text.
308. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 230.
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V OBJECTING PAYERS' RIGHTS IN THE PUBLIC FORUM
There should be no doubt that the outcome in Southworth was
correct. But the Court's reasoning is problematic, establishing an
unexplained, undefined, and unworkable standard with the potential to
undermine all student activities funds. This problematic reasoning
leaves open the possibility that similar objectors could prevail on
future claims, simply by showing viewpoint discrimination in the
actual administration of the program. We suggest a different basis for
rejecting such claims, using reasoning that eliminates the possibility of
future challenges to student activity programs and precludes similar
objector's challenges to expressive places and programs outside the
university community.
A. StudentActivities Funds as Public Forums
1. South worth Reconsidered
The Supreme Court erroneously rejected the notion that the
University of Wisconsin's student activities fund was a public forum.3"9
Rather, the Court's analysis should have proceeded from the starting
point that the program is indeed a limited public forum, dedicated to
providing resources with which student organizations may engage in
expression on a range of political and ideological subject matters and
viewpoints. Three arguments lead to this point.
The first argument follows a fortiori from Rosenberger v Rector
& Visitors of University of Virginia.3 '  The free speech aspect of
Rosenbergerrested on two distinct, but related, grounds. First, a public
university's student activities fund is a metaphysical public forum that
must be treated in the same way as a physical forum."' Second, the
metaphysical public forum of the student activities fund is not to be
309. See id. ("[T]he student activities fund is not a public forum in the traditional
sense of the term .... ); see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1424 ("[T]he Court's
opinion seems anxious.., to avoid characterizing the Wisconsin student activities fund as a
public forum.").
310. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
311. See id. at 830 ("The SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or
geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable."); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11,
at 1406 (arguing that public forums include not only physical spaces but metaphysical and
metaphorical realms that can be the locus of individual speech opportunity); Gey, supra note
12, at 1563 (discussing Rosenberger as one of the first cases to show how public forum
analysis can be used in cases involving more than the traditional context of parks and
sidewalks); see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1407 ("Rosenberger has now
become the standard bearer for one of two poles in the Court's government speech
jurisprudence," the pole in which government creates a forum for individual speech).
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operated in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner in determining which
speakers should have access to the forum. 2 The Court emphasized the
special problem of viewpoint discrimination in the public forum, of
government targeting speech because of the particular views taken by
the speaker on an otherwise permissible subject matter, resulting in a
more blatant and egregious form of impermissible content
discrimination." ' Viewpoint-discriminatory laws, the Rosenberger
Court seemed to suggest, are per se unconstitutional."
The Southworth Court's fundamental error is that it seized on the
second element of Rosenberger, the import of viewpoint neutrality, but
ignored the first. The idea that a university student activities fund
should be understood as a neutral forum for expression is not new."1
But the point assumes particular import after Rosenberger, where the
312. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (finding a free speech violation in the
program's decisions, because the "prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter,
resulted in the refusal" to fund speech "for the subjects discussed were otherwise within the
approved category of publications"); Frederick Schauer, Pinciples, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REv. 84, 105 (1998) (discussing the increasing importance of
viewpoint discrimination in government enterprise cases).
313. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; see also Martin H. Redish & Gary Lippman,
Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in Constitutional Theory: The
Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267, 282 (1991) ("[A]t least in its theoretically pure
state, the principle disallowing viewpoint regulation stands as the cornerstone of our
democratic theory."); Schauer, supra note 312, at 105 (describing the distinction between
subject matter and viewpoint discrimination as one of the important advances of recent free
speech doctrine); Geoffrey R. Stone, Comment, Anti-PornographyLegislation as Viewpoint-
Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 461, 464 (1986) ("[G]overnment may not restrict
speech because it disapproves of a particular message. In a democratic society, it is for the
people and not the government to decide what ideas are 'good' or 'bad."'); Susan H.
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 655
(1991) (describing viewpoint discrimination as the "most biased end" of a continuum of
content discrimination).
314. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; see also Stone, supra note 313, at 475
("[A]lthough the Court has never expressly held that such restrictions are per se
unconstitutional, one might fairly read that lesson into the actual record of the Court's
decisions."). But see Schauer, supra note 312, at 105 ("[I]t is hardly clear that the line
between viewpoint and other forms of content discrimination can be sustained, except
possibly in extreme cases.").
315. See Cantor, supra note 11, at 48 (arguing that, "so long as funds are available on
an equivalent basis to any student group satisfying neutral criteria," a forum for expression
had been created); Greene, supra note 17, at 14 (arguing that the pool of money consisting of
the student fees is correctly characterized as a viewpoint-neutral and subject matter-neutral
forum); see also Southworth v. Grebe, 157 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wood, D., J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the fees at the University of
Wisconsin fund a neutral public forum).
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Court explicitly and unequivocally applied a public forum
understanding to this very type of student activities fund.
'16
The Court's failure to grasp this first point is particularly
surprising because in Rosenberger, while recognizing the student
activities fund as a public forum, the Court expressly noted that the
issue of a paying student's right not to contribute to that forum
remained an open question.317 Rosenberger explicitly anticipated
Southwort&, the failure to follow the precise earlier reasoning on the
public forum point is inexplicable. Moreover, two years prior to
Southworth, all nine Justices expressed their understanding that
Rosenberger was a case in which government had created a limited
public forum through the student activities fund."8 Most importantly,
the program in Southworth was materially identical to the program in
Rosenberger In both, the university collected fees, placed the money
in a central fund controlled and administered by the student
government, and distributed grants to qualifying student organizations
to reimburse expenditures incurred for expressive activities."9
The Rosenberger Court described the student activities fund as a
"forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense,"
but subject to the same principles as a physical public forum." But
the Southworth Court stated that the materially identical student
activities fund "is not a public forum in the traditional sense of the
term" 2 ' The only way to reconcile the cases on this point is to
recognize that the student activities fund in Southworth, like the fund
in Rosenberger, is a limited metaphysical public forum, governed by
ordinary public forum principles.322
316. See Gey, supra note 12, at 1563 (arguing that Rosenbergeropened the door to the
use of a broader understanding of public forum analysis, "far removed from the traditional
context of parks and sidewalks").
317. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 ("[W]e do not have before us the question
whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to demand a pro rata return to the
extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she does not subscribe."); see also id. at
851 (O'Connor, J., concurring). ("I note the possibility that the student fee is susceptible to a
Free Speech Clause challenge by an objecting student that she should not be compelled to
pay for speech with which she disagrees.").
318. SeeNat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) (O'Connor,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 598-99
(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 615 & n.10 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
319. Compare Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
221-24 (2000), with Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823-27.
320. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
321. SeeSouthworth, 529 U.S. at230.
322. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1424 (stating that the student activities
fund "looked a lot like a public forum"); Greene, supra note 17, at 14 ("It is the open forum
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The second argument establishes the fund as a public forum by
analogy. Imagine that, rather than collecting student fees and placing
the moneys in a fund to be distributed to student organizations, the
University uses the funds to build, maintain, and staff a physical
forum-an on-campus park or stage or auditorium-at which these
student organizations' expressive activities occur. Collected funds are
used to build and maintain the physical structure, purchase sound and
light systems for speakers' use, and pay for and provide security,
maintenance, and cleanup after events. The student government
administers the location, establishing objective, viewpoint-neutral rules
as to which student organizations can have access to the park or stage
and for what types of expressive activities at what times. In other
words, imagine that the university collects and spends student fees to
establish a physical public forum and to provide student organizations
with access to that physical forum for expressive activities."'
In both situations, the university uses mandatory student fees to
provide a subsidy that enables private speakers to present and make
heard their messages.32" With the physical forum, the university
provides a physical resource and associated services for the speaker's
use; with the funding forum, the university provides financial
resources for that speaker's use. Given Rosenbergei's insistence that
the same principles apply to physical and metaphysical forums,
government's use of funds to provide a physical place for private
expression is no different for public-forum and compelled-expression
analysis than the use of funds to provide a monetary subsidy for
private expression. Using mandatory student fees to do either must be
understood as using those fees to establish and operate a public forum
on campus.325
that is funded ...."); see also Southworth v. Grebe, 157 E3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Wood, D., J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Here, both the ASM and the
University are doing nothing more than creating the forum for the expression of other
people's views.").
323. See Southworth v. Grebe, 157 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wood, D., J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("It is the same as if they simply built a large
auditorium and held it open for everyone."); see also Greene, supra note 17, at 14 ("We can
therefore analogize to other public forums funded by many people-a public park, a
municipal auditorium, a public library, a public museum.").
324. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 110 (arguing that the provision of a physical
forum for speech is a form of government subsidy); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
200 (1991) (stating that the provision of access to government-owned property is a
government subsidy).
325. See Gey, supra note 12, at 1603 (arguing for the need to "take Justice Kennedy's
notion of a 'metaphysical' public forum seriously" and to apply forum analysis to subsidy
cases as well as physical-property forum disputes).
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The third argument adopts a modified analysis of the public
forum. According to Professor Gey, public forum analysis should
consider "whether expressive activity would tend to interfere in a
significant way with the government's own activities in that forum.
326
He argues that any place or program 'specifically used for the
communication of information and ideas,"' is a forum; unless
government establishes a strong likelihood of significant interference
with that instrumentality from expression, the forum must be deemed
public, and expressive access permitted, subject only to narrow, neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions. 27
Professor Gey extends this analysis to subsidy programs, such as
in Rosenberger, specifically created for the communication of
information and ideas. Such a funding program is an instrumentality
of communication because it "facilitates the dissemination of
information or ideas," the equivalent of Justice Kennedy's
metaphysical public forum.2 The student activities fund at the
University of Wisconsin also is an instrumentality of communication,
and therefore a public forum, in that it expressly provides funds from
the public university to enable and facilitate private expression and the
dissemination of information and ideas by private student speakers to
the university community.
The issue in Southworth thus should have been whether an
individual payer may object to having the government use her portion
of mandatory fees to create, maintain, and administer a public forum
where the payer objects to, disagrees with, or does not wish to support
some particular speaker having access to the forum. Justice Souter's
326. See Gey, supra note 12, at 1576; id. at 1570 (stating the test as whether "granting
members of the public a fight to free expression would significantly interfere with the
government's own uses of public property"); see also Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that if expressive
activity would be appropriate and compatible with the ordinary uses of property, the property
is a public forum); BAKER, supra note 153, at 163 ("The government cannot restrict the use of
government facilities in a manner that prohibits substantively valued first amendment
conduct unless the conduct interferes with the constitutionally permissible purposes to which
the government has dedicated the space or facilities.").
327. See Gey, supra note 12, at 1576 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Green's
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 137 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment)); see also
BAKER, supra note 153, at 170-71 ("[W]hen regulations that restrict the expressive use of
public resources are not necessary to further dedicated uses, they should be understood as
withdrawing those resources from expressive uses, and, therefore, as abridgements of people's
freedom.").
328. See Gey, supra note 12, at 1604 ("An instrumentality of communication would
therefore be equivalent to what Justice Kennedy's Rosenberger opinion termed a
'metaphysical' public forum.").
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concurring opinion hints at this understanding, emphasizing that the
fees went only to the governmental distributing agency and only
indirectly funded the jumble of other speakers' messages."9 But
neither he nor the majority frames the issue specifically in public
forum terms.33°
A public forum understanding carries the analysis outside the
university setting. Public universities are uniquely committed to the
free exchange of ideas.3' But government at large establishes and
maintains public forums similarly dedicated to the free exchange of
ideas, to broadening public discourse, and to providing people an
opportunity to speak and to be heard.332 The public forum doctrine
finds its origins and its primary application in the community at large;
after all, the quintessential public forums are the streets, sidewalks,
parks, and village square, those places that 'time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.""'3  Municipal governments
spend public funds to maintain these quintessential traditional public
forums and to provide police and fire services, security, crowd control,
sanitation services, and sound amplification equipment so private
groups may hold parades and rallies in public spaces.
Moreover, governments at all levels and in all communities may
establish expressive subsidy programs that, like the student activities
funds in Southworth and Rosenberger, function as instrumentalities of
private dissemination of information and ideas. Consider the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA), which provides public grants to
support the work of deserving artists.334 Under Professor Gey's
329. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239-40
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
330. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1424 (arguing that the majority in
Southworth wanted to rely on public forum analysis without calling the student activities fund
a public forum).
331. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233 ("The University may determine that its mission
is well served if students have the means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical,
religious, scientific, social, and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside
the lecture hall."); Calvert, supra note 167, at 58 (emphasizing the import of the marketplace
of ideas in the unique setting of academia); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 443 (emphasizing the
"'vast unexplored bounds' of the speech public universities seek to encourage").
332. See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
333. See Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992)
(quoting Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)); Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 208; see
also Gey, supra note 12, at 1538 (arguing that the public forum doctrine derives from the
basic mythology of the lone speaker standing on a soapbox on the street comer).
334. SeeNat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998) (describing
the NEA's purpose as helping to create a climate encouraging freedom of thought,
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approach, the NEA is an instrumentality of communication dedicated
to providing government funds for private artistic expression that
should be treated as a public forum.35 Government may establish a
program such as the NEA as a limited public forum, dedicated only to
art or artistic expression, but government cannot limit the program to
funding only decent art (as it did in Flnlej), which directs a preferred
subject matter (art) towards the government's favored viewpoint
(decent and respectful).336
The Court and most commentators reject the notion that the NEA
is a public forum akin to Rosenberger, relying on the fact that student
activities funds are available generally to all qualifying organizations
for purposes related to the mission of the university, while the NEA
involves a competitive grant process, requiring government to make
inherently content-based discretionary aesthetic and qualitative
judgments about which expression to fund.37 But that distinction need
not mean that an arts funding program cannot be analyzed as a public
forum. Nor does the fact that discretionary, subjective, and qualitative
decisions must be based on nonneutral standards such as artistic
imagination, and inquiry and to provide the material conditions facilitating the release of
creative content).
335. See Gey, supranote 12, at 1604; id. at 1608-09 & n.331 (arguing that requirement
that NEA consider "decency and respect for ... diverse beliefs and values" runs afoul of the
interference analysis of public forums, understanding the NEA as a traditional sphere of free
expression); see also Cantor, supra note 11, at 36 (arguing for special status for any program
that receives compelled funds in order to perform a "substantial 'service' function").
336. SeeGey, supra note 12, at 1608-09; see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 613-14 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the NEA is a subsidy scheme created to encourage expression of
a diversity of views from private speakers and decisions as to provision of those subsidies
cannot be based on viewpoint popularity).
337. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (stating that the competitive process involved in
allocating grants, which was inherently content-based, distinguished the Endowment from the
student activities fund, which involved general access and was a limited public forum); id at
599 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]he government [in Rosenberge had
established a limited public forum-to which the NEA's granting of highly selective (if not
highly discriminating) awards bears no resemblance."); see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note
11, at 1453 (arguing that the NEA's "selection process will reveal that some artistic
communications are more valued than others and the decision that favors one artistic work
over another will depend on what the artist 'expresses' in that work"); Lackland H. Bloom,
Jr., NEA v. Finley.- A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77 WASH U. L.Q. 1, 46 (1999)
("[T]he subsidy in [Rosenberge was widely available while the one at issue in Finleywas
awarded on a competitive basis."). In a similar vein, Professor Schauer argued:
If access is mandatory, then the focus on content discrimination is redundant. But
if access is not mandatory, then the existence (or not) of a public forum is
superfluous. What is not superfluous is the question whether this is one of the
government enterprises which may control for content or viewpoint, and as to this
question public forum doctrine offers no assistance.
Schauer, supra note 312, at 99.
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excellence, artistic and cultural significance, or artistic worth.
Government discretion in making these subjective decisions can be
cabined by the "Professionalism Principle," a requirement that content-
and value-based decisions about which art to fund be committed to the
sound discretion of those people with the professional expertise in that
area to judge the excellence and merit of art, applying established
criteria applicable to the art world, removed from the prime political
actors in government and from partisan political influence.338
Decisions as to which art to fund are neither neutral nor objective, but
they may be made without regard to partisan political influences or to
nonprofessional, nonartistic ideas."'
The NEA thus may be understood as a limited public forum for
artistic expression, access to which is subject to professional
judgments of artistic merit based on established and accepted criteria.
There is no substantive difference between the NEA and the student
activities fund. As Justice Souter suggested, if the latter also relied on
competitive grants of a finite amount of funds to only a small
percentage of student applicants, it still could be understood as a public
forUm.
34 0
The point of this detour is to recognize a broader range of
government funding programs in different political communities that
function as instrumentalities of communication of information and
ideas and that should be analyzed as public forums. This public forum
status determines the proper analysis to apply to all compelled-payer
challenges to such programs. It means the analysis that should have
controlled in Southworth also controls in expressive subsidy programs
outside the university setting.
338. See SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 195; Bezanson & Buss, supranote 11, at 1511
(arguing that expressive choices as to which speech to fund must be "made by professional
and nonpolitical actors pursuant to an established and consistent process free of ideological or
political considerations"); id at 1466 ("By structuring the decision-making process in a way
that moves the actual deciders outward from the prime political actors in government, the
likelihood that artistic expression will be screened for its political acceptability is reduced.").
339. See SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 195; Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1466;
Gey, supra note 12, at 1608-09.
340. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 615 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that, had the student
activities fund in Rosenberger relied on competitive, merit-based allocations, "it is obvious
beyond peradventure that the Court would not have come out differently"); see also Bezanson
& Buss, supra note 11, at 1452 (suggesting that a strong public forum dimension is present in
an arts funding program if one assumes that government is creating a speaking opportunity
for individual members of the public).
227
TULANE LA WREVIEW
2. Objector's Rights in the Public Forum
Having reformulated Soutbworth as an objecting payer's
challenge to compelled funding of a public forum, the Court should
have rejected the plaintiffs' claims. In collecting mandatory fees for
the purpose of creating that public forum, the university acts as an
honest agent in support of free speech, enabling private speakers to
present their messages and allowing those messages to be heard.341 It
would be a "deep misunderstanding" of the compelled speech doctrine
to require that an objecting payer be able to opt out of supporting a
public forum, which essentially would permit the rights of objectors to
trump the rights of speakers making use of the forum.342
Rather, the payer who objects to the message being presented in
the public forum stands in the same position as anyone who objects to
the message being presented in the forum: neither has a right to have
that speech halted or burdened because it offends her and neither has a
right to veto speech in the public forum. 3 The burden on both the
objecting listener and the objecting funder is to avert their eyes in order
to avoid the offending message." The objecting payer also may
exercise her right to protest or speak out against those using the forum,
particularly by gaining her own access to the forum and its resources in
order to engage in counterspeech.
The objecting payer may not force government to constrict (or
ultimately close) a public forum by burdening government's ability to
collect and use community funds to operate it. Requiring government
341. See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
342. See Greene, supra note 17, at 14.
343. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)
(holding that speech cannot be financially burdened, punished, or banned simply because it
might offend a hostile listener); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("The ability of
government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others
from hearing it ... would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents simply as a
matter of personal predilections."); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949)
(overturning conviction under statute prohibiting speech that stirred people to anger or invited
public dispute); see also Bloom, supra note 337, at 38 ("To the extent that indecent art sends a
message or expresses a point of view that deeply offends some significant segment of the
public, this type of harm is simply a legitimate cost of freedom of speech that the offended
viewers must bear."); Gey, supra note 12, at 1586 ("[T]he principle of unrestricted public
speech is unmediated by the fact that the expression will be heard or seen by unwilling
listeners or viewers .... ); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FrstAmendmen4
25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 215-16 (1983) ("The Court's reluctance to accept the 'heckler's
veto,' and its refusal to permit one group of citizens effectively to 'censor' the expression of
others because they dislike... their ideas, seems well-grounded in the central precepts of the
first amendment.").
344. SeeCohen,403 U.S. at21.
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to refund moneys supporting the forum whenever an objectionable
speaker uses that forum decreases the amount of money available to
operate the forum and increases the administrative hassles involved in
operating it, as government attempts to determine which payers object
to which speakers and to grant pro rata opt-outs or refunds
accordingly. "5  This is true for the funding forum at issue in
Southworth, for our hypothetical campus auditorium, and for all
physical and metaphysical public forums in all political communities.
The Southworth Court's requirement of viewpoint neutrality as a
structural safeguard is incoherent under a public forum understanding.
If a public forum, whether physical or metaphysical, is administered in
a viewpoint-discriminatory manner, it does not cease to be a public
forum. To be sure, it is a viewpoint-discriminatory public forum, an
unconstitutionally administered public forum, subject to challenge by
any speaker denied or burdened in her access on the basis of her
message or point of view.346 However, it remains a public forum,
regardless of its viewpoint-discriminatory administration. From the
payer's standpoint, lack of viewpoint neutrality in the operation of the
forum cannot transform the compulsion to fund the government's
management of the forum into a compulsion to fund directly the
private speech that occurs there.
The viewpoint-neutrality rule becomes especially problematic
under a public forum understanding. That logically demands that a
single viewpoint-discriminatory denial of access to the forum to one
speaker open the floodgates for objector's claims from every payer
who does not wish to fund the speech of some or all speakers and
345. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232
(2000) (holding that establishing a refund system for the student activities fund "could be so
disruptive and expensive that the program to support extracurricular speech would be
ineffective"); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1427 ("The Abood precedent requires a
remedial means that is unworkable because any system requiring optional fees or a way for
students to opt out from paying for specified activities would be disruptive and expensive and
thus ineffective."); Cantor, supra note 11, at 26 (arguing that "[s]erious administrative tangles
would inevitably result" from according a broad freedom of conscience a high constitutional
status against government expenditures); see also supra notes 144-147 and accompanying
text.
346. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998)
(involving an action brought by a candidate excluded from government-sponsored debate);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825-26 (1995) (involving an
action brought by a student organization dedicated to publishing campus newspaper and
denied funding from student activities fund); Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 127
(involving an action brought by an organization seeking to hold demonstration and rally on
courthouse steps).
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organizations otherwise entitled to access to that public forum.347 That
is, of course, in addition to the First Amendment claim that the denied
speaker may assert to gain access to the forum. Faced with such a
multitude of challenges to the operation of the fund-both from those
who want access to the forum and from those who wish not to provide
money to it-the university likely will close the forum, discontinue the
funding program, resulting in no voices being heard.318  This is
precisely what the Southworth Court was trying to avoid when it
asserted that the "First Amendment does not require the University to
put the program at risk."'349
The reliance on viewpoint neutrality in evaluating objecting
payers' rights produces the perverse result of an overall decrease in the
amount of speech, contrary to the very purpose of establishing public
forums, which is to increase the sum total of available expression in
the marketplace.5 If government makes a single improper viewpoint-
discriminatory denial of access, it now must refund some portion of
the collected funds to any objecting payer or payers; this decreases the
amount of money available to operate the forum, thereby reducing the
size and viability of the forum and the amount of speech it can
accommodate. By contrast, the ordinary remedy where a speaker
unconstitutionally is denied access to a public forum is to require
government to admit that speaker to the forum; this broadens access
and increases the sum total of expression facilitated by the forum and
available in the marketplace. 5'
The reliance on viewpoint neutrality as a structural safeguard
appears to rest on the notion that the objecting payer has no claim as
long as she and her organization have equal access to the student
activities fund for their own speech. 2 Perhaps the Court's intention
was to create an alternate remedy for the denied speaker-she may
request access or she may request a refund. However, access should be
the only remedy for a speaker denied access to a public forum; this
remedies the constitutional violation while furthering the goal of
347. See supra notes 300-308 and accompanying text.
348. Cf Forbes, 523 U.S. at 681 (suggesting that, faced with a choice between an
unwieldy forum and First Amendment liability, government might choose to present no
voices at all).
349. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 232.
350. See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
352. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233 (stating that a university supports extracurricular
expression from its students through compelled fees in the interest of open discussion in a
viewpoint neutral manner and that same viewpoint neutrality ensures the integrity of the
program's operation once the funds have been collected).
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disseminating the greatest amount of speech. The remedy should not
be a refund of fees paid to maintain the forum, having the opposite
effect and potentially endangering the existence and administration of
the forum itself.
B. Application of the Compelled-Expression Doctrine to Public
Forums
We have recognized that the student activities fund in Southworth
is a public forum and that objector's claims against funding this, and
other, public forums must fail. We also have recognized that the
protections imposed by the Southworth Court are unworkable on this
understanding of the university's student activities fund. The next
question is why the right not to be compelled by government to
provide financial support for objectionable private speech does not
extend to government-compelled financial support for the public
forum in or through which that objectionable private speech will occur.
Under the analytical model for compelled expression established
here, an objecting payer's free speech right is triggered if, and only if,
she is compelled by the government to pay fees directly to a private
speaker and that speaker uses those payments for expressive purposes.
The focus of the inquiry is narrow. We look at where the money goes
immediately after it leaves the payer's hands and for what purpose,
whether the funds are paid directly by the funder to a private speaker
for something that is expressive or whether paid by the funder to some
other entity for something that is not expressive.353 This three-part
model best explains why the objectors' claims properly failed in
Southworth and why any challenges to the compelled funding of
public forums, physical or metaphysical, in the university or in the
community at large, similarly must fail.
First, and foremost, is the basic structural point of public forums.
No speech is, in fact, funded with any fees charged and collected by
the government in maintaining a public forum. Only the forum is
funded;5 4 that is, only the physical place and the services associated
with that place or only the pool of money. That physical place and
pool of money are, in and of themselves, nonexpressive things and no
free speech rights attach to compelled payments for nonexpressive
353. See supra Part III.
354. See Greene, supra note 17, at 14 ("It is the open forum that is funded. ); see
also Southworth v. Grebe, 157 E3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wood, D., J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane) ("[Bloth the ASM and the University are doing nothing more
than creating the forum for the expression of other people's views.").
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things. 5 The forum itself, distinct from any uses of that forum, is not
expressive in nature. Establishing and maintaining the forum is not an
intrinsically expressive act and the use of the funds to establish and
maintain the forum is not an intrinsically expressive expenditure. This
is the touchstone of the analysis.
Further, the immediate recipient of the funds in the public forum
situation is the government, not the private speaker. Money moves
from the compelled payer to the government, without any knowledge,
thought, or notion, by payer or government, of the ultimate private
speaker who later will use these funds or the product of these funds.
The payer funds the governmental distributing agency.56 Payers have
no right to object to payments that do not go directly to the private
speaker, particularly when those funds go to government for
nonexpressive expenditures. Any incursion on conscience resulting
from expression that occurs in the forum, as a remote result of
nonexpressive government expenditures on the public forum itself,
must be understood as a necessary "concomitant of living in an
organized society35 7 This is particularly true of an organized society
that is committed to the enhancement of free speech and public
discourse.358
Consider the example of the on-campus auditorium or park paid
for with collected mandatory student fees. Moneys compelled from
the student payers go to the university and the student government-
the relevant government entities-neither of which is a speaker. The
university uses those funds to erect and maintain the building or
physical space, to pay the costs of administering the space, and to pay
for services associated with the use of the space, such as security and
crowd control during events, sound systems, and maintenance. None
of these expenditures is for speech; the physical place or structure is
not expressive, nor is the campus police force that provides security
and crowd control.
355. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
356. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 240 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that payers fund only the governmental distributing agency, which itself engages in no
expression).
357. SeeCantor, supra note 11, at 25.
358. See BAKER, supra note 153, at 170 (arguing that government must exhibit a level
of concern for ensuring private speech and assembly in government-owned areas); SMOLLA,
supra note 153, at 208-09 (arguing for a community's duty to provide public forums
dedicated to free expression and the exchange of ideas); BeVier, supra note 169, at 101 ("The
Enhancement model ... sometimes imposes affirmative duties on government to maximize
the opportunities for expression.").
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In other words, the compelled payments are spent directly and
immediately only on the nonexpressive place and associated services.
The objector cannot be understood as paying for the speech that occurs
in that physical forum and with the aid of those services, and she
cannot be understood as giving anything to the speaker.3"9 The payer
cannot challenge the portion of her funds paying the salary of a
campus police officer-a nonexpressive actor engaging in
nonexpressive activities-simply because that officer is assigned to
provide security for a private expressive event in the public forum that
presents a message with which the payer disagrees.
This analysis carries outside the university to physical forums in
the community at large.36 When a municipal government uses dollars
359. See Greene, supra note 17, at 14 ("[M]any voices are then heard in the forum,
none specifically attributable to any one citizen or citizens, none specifically fostered by any
one citizen or citizens.").
360. We put to one side the question of whether a payer has standing to challenge the
expenditure of her tax dollars and other mandatory payments in establishing and maintaining
a public forum. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923) (rejecting
standing of single taxpayer to enjoin operation of statute unless he can show that "he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally"). We note several points that render the standing point less than absolute and that
justify proceeding to the First Amendment merits of an objecting taxpayer's challenge to the
use of compelled payments to fund a physical public forum.
First, a public forum could be funded by compelled payments that do not qualify as
taxes, such as assessments imposed on members of a particular industry, as in United Foods
and Wileman Bros. That would be sufficient direct injury to confer standing on a payer.
Second, the rule against taxpayer standing is considerably more relaxed at the municipal
level, suggesting that a municipal taxpayer more easily could establish standing to object to a
local program designed to provide resources and a physical place to private speakers. See
Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486 ("The interests of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of
its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is
not inappropriate."). Third, and most importantly, taxpayer standing rules are different when
the government expends funds in a manner that may violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. As the court stated in Flast v Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968):
[A] taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial
power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending
clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict
the exercise of the taxing and spending power. The taxpayer's allegation in such
cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of
specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.
The Establishment Clause often is understood as a structural restraint on government
power, preventing government from imposing on individuals certain religious messages, at
least through the expenditure of public funds. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment
Clause as a Structuml Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IowA L. REV. 1, 4 (1998); see
also id. at 5-6 (arguing that relaxed standing requirements under Establishment Clause
support this structural understanding); Neal R. Feigenson, Political Standing and
Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause
Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 64 (1990) (describing argument that by "expending tax
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collected from members of the community to provide police security,
traffic and crowd control, and sanitation services for the Gay Pride
Parade through the streets of the city, tax money is spent on police,
traffic, and sanitation services, as well as on the general maintenance
of streets themselves. Again, these are nonexpressive expenditures;
neither paying to pave a street nor paying a police officer's salary is
expressive. Importantly, these expenditures do not become expressive
merely because the streets are used for offensive private speech or
because the police officer protects those offensive speakers. Moreover,
these are government expenditures, further removing them from
objector's challenge.
The Supreme Court should have used this precise reasoning in
rejecting the challenge to the student activities fund in Southworth.
Under the primary portion of the University of Wisconsin program,
which the Court upheld as constitutional, students paid their
mandatory activities fee of $165 to the University, which placed the
money in one of several funds controlled and administered by the
student government.36' The immediate recipients of the moneys are the
relevant government bodies, the university and the student
government, neither of which is acting as a speaker.3"2 The immediate
use of the money is to establish and maintain the fund itself, the pot of
money, a nonexpressive thing. The individual student funds only that
nonexpressive pool of cash; she does not fund the private speakers who
receive money or the private expression that ultimately occurs with the
resources from that pot. 6' The payer's free speech right is not triggered
by compelled payment to government for nonexpressive uses.
revenues to assist religion, government effectively compels some people to support religion
against the dictates of conscience"). The compelled speech doctrine arguably reads a similar
structural restraint into the Free Speech Clause, prohibiting government from imposing
certain private messages on individuals by requiring them to pay money to fund or support
such messages. If so, then the same relaxed standing rules also might apply when a taxpayer
objects to the expenditure of at least her portion of tax dollars to support private speech.
361. See supra notes 245-250 and accompanying text.
362. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229
(2000) ("The case we decide here, however, does not raise the issue of the government's right,
or, to be more specific, the state-controlled University's right, to use its own funds to advance
a particular message."); id. at 240 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
student activities fees fund only the distributing agency presenting no distinct expression or
message). Under our analysis, of course, the objecting students could not challenge the
University's use of compelled funds for its own expression. See supra notes 124-134 and
accompanying text.
363. See Greene, supra note 17, at 14 ("[M]any voices are then heard in the forum,
none specifically attributable to any one citizen or citizens, none specifically fostered by any
one citizen or citizens."); see also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 239-40 (Souter, J., concurring in
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We can illustrate the analysis further by comparing a situation in
which the objector's right might be triggered: the secondary portion of
the Wisconsin program in Southworth, in which a majority of the
student body votes to award funds to a specific student organization."
In this situation, the student in effect pays her compelled fees directly
to a favored private organization, as determined by majority vote, and
that organization immediately uses those fees for expression."' Under
our test, the objector's right is triggered. The student in this portion of
the program is not funding the public forum; she is funding a specific,
majority-determined expressive organization in the dissemination of its
private (and perhaps, although not necessarily, objectionable) message.
She is compelled by government to provide funds for the immediate
benefit of a known speaker. This is what the compelled speech
doctrine prevents; even under our analysis, the Court was correct in
remanding for further inquiry into this aspect of the University of
Wisconsin program.
Finally, we look outside the university to the NEA and similar
expressive subsidy programs, properly understood as metaphysical
public forums subject to cabined discretionary judgments under
professionalism principles.66 An objecting payer's challenge to the
moneys going to a particular offensive art project funded by an NEA
grant would fail for the same reason a challenge to the primary student
activities fund fails. The individual taxpayer gives money to the
government, not to the artist. Tax or assessment dollars fund a central
pool of money controlled and administered by the Endowment, the
governmental distributing agency, not the individual artist's expression.
Taxpayers are compelled to fund only that nonexpressive pot of money,
not the ultimate expressive use of some portion of these resources by
the judgment) (arguing that the collected fees indirectly fund the jumble of other speakers'
voices).
364. See South worth, 529 U.S. at 224; see also supra note 249 and accompanying text.
365. It is likely that the funds awarded to an organization via voter referendum do not
go directly to the organization, but actually pass through the government first, which then
passes the funds to the favored group. But the analysis is the same. When government
collects compelled fees explicitly earmarked for a private speaker, it effectively orders
payment from the compelled payer to that designated private organization. This is why the
second prong of our model looks to whether funds are paid directly and immediately to, or
for the express benefit of, a private speaker. See discussion supra Part III. Payment of funds
for a designated speaker might be akin to a situation in which the government establishes and
maintains a physical forum for the exclusive long-term use of one particular private speaker.
SeeKamenshine, supmnote 135, at 1141.
366. See supra notes 334-340 and accompanying text. We again put to one side
whether a federal taxpayer lacks standing to challenge the expenditure of her tax dollars for
such an expressive program as the NEA. See discussion supra note 360.
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the individual artist who receives an NEA grant and produces art with
the aid of that grant. Once more, such nonexpressive expenditures by
government cannot trigger an objecting payer's right.
C Other Explanations for the Denial of Objector Rights
This analytical model provides the most coherent and consistent
explanation for why objecting payers cannot challenge the use of
compelled payments to establish and maintain physical public forums
and expressive subsidy programs understood as metaphysical public
forums. Commentators have suggested other explanations, none
satisfactory. The problem is that all ignore the public forum point and
the fact that funding a public forum means funding a nonexpressive
government program, rather than any private speech or speaker. These
commentators rely instead on explanations that are inconsistent with
compelled-expression principles, public forum principles, or both.
1. Justice Souter
Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Southworth suggests that
he understood the outlines of the public forum nature of the student
activities fund, even though he did not speak in public forum terms.367
He focused on two reasons for rejecting Southworth's free speech
claim, which might be understood as providing a basis for rejecting all
objections to funding public forums: (1) the attenuated, indirect
connection between the funders and any objectionable message
ultimately produced with moneys from the activities fund,368 and (2) the
governmental purpose of broadening public discourse.369 These
factors, Justice Souter argues, render the plaintiffs' claims weaker than
the successful objectors' claims in Aboodand Keller(as well as United
Foods, which would be decided one year later).7
367. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 239-40 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment)
(describing the student activities fund as requiring payers to fund the distributing agency and
to "indirectly fund[] the jumble of other speakers' messages").
368. See id at 240 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Bezanson & Buss,
supra note 11, at 1434 ("[N]o reasonable person, knowledgeable of the student fee system
and its purposes, would attribute the views of any single group supported by the fees to
individual students whose only connection with the group was their payment of a mandatory
fee."); Cantor, supra note 11, at 20 ("Nor can the views of a university organization be fairly
attributed to the individual students whose fees support the central organization and its
funded beneficiaries."); Greene, supra note 17, at 14 ("[M]any voices are then heard in the
forum, none specifically attributable to any one citizen or citizens, none specifically fostered
by any one citizen or citizens.").
369. See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 240-41 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
370. See id. at 242-43 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Neither of these rationales, alone or in combination, sufficiently
explains the rejection of the compelled-expression claim in
Southworth. First, as previously argued, a close connection between
funder and message should not be a constitutional necessity in the
ordinary compelled funding case.' It certainly should not be an issue
where the forum itself and its jumbled multitude of voices, rather than
a specific private speaker, is funded.
Second, government-compelled direct support for private
expression is impermissible even if supported by an important
government interest. The state of West Virginia wanted to foster
national unity by requiring the Pledge of Allegiance. "2 The agency-
shop laws in Abood and Lehnert were supported by concededly
important government purposes of ensuring labor peace and enabling
unions to avoid free riders. " ' In United Foods, Congress sought,
through the Mushroom Council, to pursue the goals of promoting and
supporting the mushroom industry and providing information about
mushrooms to consumers. "4 In Hurley, the Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group sought access to the parade pursuant to the state's public
accommodations law, a statute specifically designed to prevent and
remedy invidious discrimination against identifiable, vulnerable
minority groups." None of these government purposes-particularly
the interests underlying the antidiscrimination law-seems less
compelling than the interest in broadening public discourse, yet all
were held insufficient to justify direct compelled utterance or support
of political and ideological speech.
Even assuming that broadening public discourse is a uniquely
important government purpose,"6 such purpose could not justify a true
compulsion that an individual directly fund the speech of another
private entity. Imagine that the government, concerned that the ACLU
371. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 116 (describing this as a "make-weight" in the
Court's analysis); see also supra notes 216-227 and accompanying text.
372. See W Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (stating that
there is no question or debate as to "[niational unity as an end which officials may foster").
373. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1991); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 224 (1977); see also Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S.
1, 12 (1990) (stating that the state's bar membership requirement was aimed at regulating the
legal profession and at preventing free-riders from reaping benefits of their unique status as a
lawyer licensed to practice in the state).
374. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001).
375. SeeHurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 571
(1995).
376. See Jacobs, supra note 11, at 446 (arguing in support of the "collective majority's
power to compel its members to support the common purpose of adjusting the relative
weights of the voices in the marketplace of ideas to promote more full dialogue and debate").
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or the Rutherford Institute will be unable to get its message out,
requires every adult citizen to donate $1000 directly to each
organization. The underlying interest is broadening and diversifying
public debate, ensuring that those two speakers have the resources and
ability to be heard in the marketplace, adjusting the relative weights of
voices in the marketplace. Such a requirement almost certainly would
and should violate the payers' free speech rights.377 The requirement
that GLIB be permitted to march in the private parade arguably was
supported by a government interest in broadening the discourse of the
parade, ensuring that an additional, vulnerable minority voice would
be presented and heard by the large crowd that would witness the
event. But the Hurley Court emphatically rejected the imposition of
such a burden on the private parade organizers.
It is at best disputable whether government's interest in
broadening and diversifying public discourse ever justifies compelled
private expression.379 It certainly is disputable whether such an interest
provides a greater justification for compelled expression than any of
the interests the Court has rejected.
2. Robert Kamenshine
Professor Kamenshine offers an explanation containing two
separate, but related points. First, he argues that most traditional
public forums, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are "primarily
designed, funded, and constructed to serve a non-communicative
purpose, and are used only incidentally for First Amendment
activity." 8' Streets and sidewalks primarily are used for transportation
and movement, the steps of the courthouse primarily are used for
egress and ingress from the courthouse, parks primarily provide
recreation, beauty, and open space. 8' In compelling funding of such
physical places (through mandatory taxes, fees, and assessments),
government compels funding for primarily nonexpressive purposes
377. The compelled payment would be unconstitutional regardless of whether the
individual agreed or disagreed with the organization that she was forced to fund. See
Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 115 (arguing that it is hard to imagine that the Court would
uphold a requirement that each person contribute to the political party of her choice). This
illustrates why disagreement with the funded message is more a make-weight than a true
element of compelled-expression analysis. See supranotes 203-215 and accompanying text.
378. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574-75.
379. See Redish & Kaludis, supra note 44, at 1122.
380. Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 108.
381. See Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696-97
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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and the objector's right is not implicated by the secondary expressive
purposes or uses.
This argument is on the right track, but it does not go far enough.
The issue is not whether the use of the forum is primarily or
secondarily expressive. The issue is that the designated public forum
in and of itself, distinct from the private use of that forum, is not
expressive.382
Professor Kamenshine leaves an analytical gap between
traditional public forums, those places that "immemorially time out of
mind" have been preserved for expression (primarily or incidentally),383
and designated public forums, those places that government
specifically and intentionally has established, opened, and maintained
primarily for expressive purposes, by opening a nontraditional space
for public discourse." However, access requirements are the same for
traditional and designated public forums.8 It follows that such forums
should be treated the same when considering whether an objecting
payer may challenge the use of her compelled fees to establish and
maintain either type of forum. This is particularly true given that
traditional public forums, such as streets and parks, cannot alone
satisfy individual free speech needs in a private society; this obligates
382. See supra notes 354-355 and accompanying text.
383. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)
("Traditional public fora are defined by the objective characteristics of the property, such as
whether, 'by long tradition or by government fiat,' the property has been 'devoted to assembly
and debate."') (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)); Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 679 (describing streets and
parks as places that have traditionally been available for public expression, that have
'"immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions"') (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-516 (1939));
SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 208.
384. SeeForbes, 523 U.S. at 677 ('" [T]he Court has looked to the policy and practice
of the government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open
to assembly and debate as a public forum."') (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)); Int'l Soc'y ofKn'shna Consciousness, Inc., 505
U.S. at 678 (describing a designated public forum, either of limited or unlimited character, as
property that the state has opened for expressive activity by all or part of the public); SMOLLA,
supra note 153, at 210; Gey, supra note 12, at 1547; see also id at 1570 (arguing for the
elimination of the designated or limited public forum category in favor of consideration of
whether the speech at issue is compatible with the typical usage of the government property).
385. See Int'l Soc'y of Kishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 678 (stating that
regulation of a designated public forum property is subject to the same limitations as that
governing a traditional public forum); SMOLLA, supra note 153, at 210 ("The same legal
standards for regulating speech thus apply to Category I 'traditional' forums and Category II
'designated' forums."); Gey, supra note 12, at 1547 ("[O]nce a court deems a non-traditional
forum 'public,' the speaker is well on the way to gaining access to that forum.").
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government to create new forums, physical or otherwise, in order to
fulfill its constitutional duty to provide sufficient opportunities for
private expression.386
Under Professor Kamenshine's approach, an objecting payer
arguably could prevail if she shows that the designated public forum
funded by her compelled fees was intentionally opened by the
government for the express, primary, or even sole purpose of
supporting private speech. This makes expressive subsidy forums,
such as the NEA or the university student activities fund, uniquely
vulnerable to compelled-expression challenge, even if other forums,
such as city sidewalks, are not.
Further, this would require different treatment of different
designated forums, depending on the primary purpose behind the
establishment of that physical space. For example, an objecting payer
would be unable to challenge the use of her money where
objectionable private speech occurs in a classroom used as an public
forum after school hours. The primary use of the classroom (and the
primary reason the government expends collected funds to maintain
that classroom) is public education; the private expressive use is
secondary and incidental.387 However, that same objecting payer would
be able to challenge the use of a public auditorium that has been built,
funded, and maintained primarily, specifically, and exclusively to
provide a forum for private expression, such as theatrical
productions.3 8 And that payer would be able to challenge funds going
to any metaphysical forum, such as a student activities fund or the
NEA, programs having no existence and no purpose outside of the
386. See BAKER, supra note 153, at 171 (arguing that in a location in which weather
may prevent outdoor expressive activity, government cannot ban expressive activities in
indoor locations); Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1409 ("[T]he needs of individuals for
free speeqh opportunities in a modem society have not been fully satisfied by the traditional
public forum.").
387. See Good News Club, Inc. v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001)
(assuming, based on stipulation, that school district established a limited public forum when it
opened classrooms for after-hours uses for a range of expressive purposes).
388. Cf Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (holding
that a municipal auditorium is a public forum designed for and dedicated to expressive
activities); id at 563 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas
argued:
A municipal theater is no less a forum for the expression of ideas than is a public
park, or a sidewalk; the forms of expression adopted in such a forum may be more
expensive and more structured than those typically seen in our parks and streets,
but they are surely no less entitled to the shelter of the First Amendment.
Id. (Douglas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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government decision to create them in order to facilitate the
dissemination of expression by providing funds to private speakers.
Professor Kamenshine's second point is that, "to the extent that
the First Amendment itself compels free access to public fora for
purposes of engaging expression, there is no basis for complaint by
dissenting taxpayers." '389 This again creates different outcomes,
depending on whether the objecting payer challenges a traditional or
designated public forum.
This also permits an objecting payer to challenge government's
decision to establish the designated forum in the first instance, that is,
government's determination that the designated forum is necessary to
fulfill the community's obligation to provide opportunities for
expression. Government's primary purpose in establishing a subsidy
program or other nontraditional public forum is to facilitate private
expression, some of which might be objectionable to the individual
payer. If an individual payer could establish that the designated forum
is not, in fact, necessary to fulfill the community's expressive needs-
because, for example, the community has enough other forums to
accommodate private expression-she could argue that the First
Amendment does not, in fact, compel access to a particular place or
program. Under Professor Kamenshine's rule, that forum becomes
subject to challenge by an objecting payer on the ground-that the First
Amendment does not mandate it.
3. Lackland Bloom
Professor Bloom shadows the second Kamenshine point about
government having no choice but to provide access. He suggests that a
broad congressional interest in protecting taxpayer sensibilities may
justify viewpoint discrimination in certain subsidy programs, such as
the NEA 9° Professor Bloom defends the result in Finley, where the
Court upheld the requirement that the NEA fund only works that
reflect decency and respect for ordinary American values, arguing that
the restriction serves the governmental interest in protecting taxpayer
sensibilities by not forcing taxpayers to fund offensive aft39'
389. See Kamenshine, supra note 23, at 108.
390. SeeBloom, supra note 337, at 37.
391. See id. ("[T]he First Amendment should tolerate the decency and respect clause
... because the harm to the taxpayer from being forced to fund indecent and disrespectful art
is a distinct and cognizable type of harm from which Congress should be able to provide
protection."); id at 39 (arguing that the "interest in not forcing taxpayers to financially
support objectionable speech is a distinct and cognizable injury worthy of legal recognition
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He argues that this reasoning would not apply to the university
student activities funds in Rosenberger and Southworth. In such
broad-based, nondiscretionary subsidy programs, government has no
choice but to fund a particular speaker; taxpayers simply must
understand that government has no choice but to provide funds to a
particular speaker.392 He argues that
[a]llowing speakers to use a public forum is a type of subsidy, but
because it is made available on a nondiscretionary basis, the taxpayer
should understand that the Government is not using public funds to
select and prefer an offensive assault on community norms; rather, it is
simply playing host to all points of view."'
Although this understanding "may not wholly eliminate the indignity
of being forced to subsidize offensive speech" it "should go a long
way toward minimizing it.""'
Professor Bloom's distinction between these two different subsidy
programs fails once we recognize the NEA and other discretionary
subsidy programs as public forums, instrumentalities specifically used
for the communication and dissemination of information and ideas,
albeit governed by somewhat different principles in making access
decisions.9  Professor Bloom's approach, like Professor
Kamenshine's, impermissibly demands different rules for different
types of public forums. This results in different analysis for different
compelled speech claims, depending on the operational specifics of
the particular forum. This similarly ignores the more basic point that
and respect"); id. ("In arts funding, the Government allocates the funds in a way that attempts
to take account of taxpayer sensibilities.").
Professor Bloom disclaims the suggestion that recognition of this interest means "every
disgruntled taxpayer has the right to complain about any disbursement of federal funds to
promote a message or cause with which he disagrees." Id at 39. He argues that this interest
in protecting taxpayer sensibilities is asserted not by the individual taxpayer, but by the
majority through the legislative process, and that the doors are not open to every malcontent
to bring the government to a halt. See id But there is no reason for this limitation. If
taxpayers have a First Amendment interest in not having objectionable art funded with
government funds, there is no reason that the individual taxpayer may not assert that interest
on her own. If there is an interest in sensibilities, liberty, and conscience to be protected
through the legislature, there is no reason individuals should not be able to protect those same
interests through the courts, at least assuming satisfaction of standing requirements. See
discussion supra note 360.
392. SeeBloom, supranote 337, at 46.
393. Id.
394. See id.; see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 11, at 1434 (arguing that no
reasonable person, knowledgeable of the student fee system and its purpose, would attribute
the views of any speaker to individual students whose only connection is a compelled
payment).
395. See supra notes 334-340 and accompanying text.
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payers fund only the nonexpressive government-controlled pool of
money that constitutes the forum, not the private speakers, their private
speech, or any assault that the private speech might impose on payers'
sensibilities.
4. Leslie Jacobs
Professor Jacobs recognizes that the governmental purpose in
creating the student activities fund is to create a forum specifically to
support speech.396 She argues, as Justice Souter did, that the balance of
interests changes precisely because government's purpose is to foster
exposure to a wide range of views, promote fairness in the
presentation of views, and protect disfavored speakers.97 The key is
that the forum (i.e., the subsidy fund) and the speech that will occur
with the aid of that fund are linked, that "where creating a public forum
is the purpose, funding speech in the university context is not
incidental to some other nonspeech objective. Funding speech is the
objective. 398
This distinguishes the student fees case from prior compelled-
expression cases. In the union cases, government mandated
membership in an organization designed to serve a primarily
nonspeech collective function, with expressive activities only
tangentially related to that purpose.9  Any speech by the union was
incidental to the primary, nonexpressive purpose for which it collected
dues; such speech was dispensable and there would be no harm to the
union's central, nonexpressive function if it could not speak with
compelled funds. °  By contrast, funding speech is the very purpose
for compelling the student fees. Speech is indispensable and directly
related to the central purpose of the university's program, which would
396. See Jacobs, supra note 11, at 456.
397. See id. at 470 (arguing that a university is justified in expending compelled fees
to create a forum, because its purpose is to foster intellectual diversity linked to its
educational mission and to promote fairness in the presentation of views to its students); id at
456 ("[W]here the government creates and structures a public forum, its speech-conscious
action may serve rather than thwart free speech clause values."); Jacobs, supra note 7, at 176
("[C]reating a public forum to promote diverse expression should be viewed as a justification
that can meet strict review."); see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217, 240-41 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Southworth's
objection has less force than it might otherwise carry because the challenged fees support a
government program that aims to broaden public discourse.").
398. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 444 (footnote omitted).
399. Seeidat443-44.
400. See id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 7, at 174 ("[C]ontributions, even for speech,
may be constitutional if germane to the (presumptively nonspeech) purpose for the
compulsion.").
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be harmed if government could not use mandatory fees to fund
speakers. In other words, the use of compelled payments is valid
where speech is the main purpose of the compulsion, as in
Southworth, but not where it is an incidental or tangential purpose of
that compulsion.
One problem with this explanation is that two recent decisions
turn it on its head. In Wileman Bros., the Court rejected the objecting
compelled payer's claim precisely because any generic advertising
funded by the mandatory assessments on tree-fruit growers was
incidental to the broader nonexpressive purpose of the economic
regulatory scheme."1 In United Foods, the Court accepted the
objector's claim precisely because virtually all the funds collected were
used for a single expressive purpose, generic advertising, and the
organization had no nonexpressive purpose independent of the speech
itself.4 2 The United Foods Court insisted that it could not uphold
"compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program where the
principal object is speech itself.'" 3 In other words, compelled speech
problems arise where the purpose of the compelled payment is
supporting speech, but do not arise where the primary purpose is
nonexpressive; this contradicts Professor Jacobs' model. The outcome
in Southworth, and other cases of funding public forums, cannot rest
on this rationale.
Our more basic departure from Professor Jacobs should be
apparent. Compelled funding of public forums is not, as she argues,
immune from objector's challenge because funding speech is the
explicit, permissible government objective in collecting the funds to
operate the forum."4  Her explanation suffers from the same
weaknesses as does Justice Souter's explanation. First, an important
government interest never has justified compelled expression.'40 5
Second, the same government interest in enhancing expression or
aiding some private speakers cannot and would not justify the
paradigmatic government compulsion that payers give money directly
to a private speaker to be used for that speaker's own private
401
message.
401. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457,477 (1997); see supra notes
89-104 and accompanying text.
402. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405,412-17 (2001); see supra notes
105-112 and accompanying text.
403. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415.
404. See Jacobs, supa note 11, at 470; Jacobs, supra note 7, at 176.
405. See supra notes 372-375 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 376-379 and accompanying text.
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The funding of public forums must be immune from objector's
challenge for a different reason. No private expression is funded with
the compelled fees, taxes, or payments. Where a public forum,
physical or metaphysical, on-campus or in the community at large, is
funded, payers give money to a government agency, not to any private
speaker, and the payers fund only the forum itself, the physical place,
the pot of money, and associated services, none of which are
expressive. The payers do not fund the private speech that ultimately
occurs in or through that forum. Their free speech interests have not
been impinged and their free speech rights have not been triggered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Southworth Court's reasoning carried it to a correct decision.
But that reasoning leaves just enough room for potential plaintiffs to
wreak havoc with similar university student activities fund programs,
as well as with all manner of public forums, physical and
metaphysical, subsidy programs, streets, sidewalks, parks, and
auditoriums, on- and off-campus. Whether such challenges arise
remains to be seen. But that does not obviate the need to establish a
more proper and workable analytical model.
Under a more proper model for addressing objecting payer
challenges to funding public forums, the Court should reject the
plaintiffs' claims because the compelled-expression doctrine does not
extend to situations in which individuals pay money to a government
body for a nonexpressive expenditure, such as maintaining a public
forum. Such an approach would be most consistent with the theory
and doctrine underlying the protection from compelled expression; it
places acceptable, and necessary, limits on how far objecting payers'
interests go, while not destroying the vital protections against
compelled expression. Most importantly, this model preempts future
challenges to public forums and other government programs designed
to promote, enhance, and facilitate public discourse that do not involve
the direct, compulsory funding or support of private expression.
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